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Foreword
The papers presented herein were originally prepared as supplements
to the "NASA Reactor Facility Hazards Summary" (vol. I) in 1956-1958.
Supplement II is an evaluation of the proposed facility made by the
Armour Research Foundation of lllinois Institute of Technology at the
request of the NACA (now the NASA). Supplements IV, V_ and VI were
compiled in answer to questions raised by the Atomic Energy Commission.
Additional information unavailable when volume I was submitted to the
Atomic Energy Commission is contained in supplements I and Ill.
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!. SOME PRELIMINARY ANALYSES OF REACTOR KINETICS AND CONTROL
By Aaron S. Boksenbom
November 1_ 1956
I. - LONG TERM Xe AND Sm TRANSIENTS
The operational flexibility and reactivity requirements of a high
flux thermal reactor are greatly affected by the large cross section
fission products, Xe i3[i and Sm149. They are responsible for reactivi-
ties of approximately -4 and -i percent, respectively, in equilibrium
operation at high flux. Following a cut-back in flux level_ these poi-
sonin_ effects increase considerably, possibly shutting down the reactor
and even prohibiting operation for as much as several days. An analysis
of the transient build-up and decay of Xe and Sm for various cut-backs
in flux level and for various start-ups follows.
l.I Xe - LONG TERM TRANSIENTS
The decay and burnout cl_ain for Xe 135, at any point in the core,
can be described as follows (ref. i):
i d {Te _ + {Te _ _ F
1 d fI \ {"I \ %'e (i.i)
*,2 dt_e) _I e) Te e
if+ a
d IXe ._ Xe _I e Fe)
where conditions are taken with reference to any equilibrium condition,
"e " and
F fission rate
k. ,k._ ,k 3
3"
a
decay constants of Te, I, and Xe respective])_
,_.rosssection of Xe " 5×106 barns
3 3
ratio of direct yield of Xe to direct vie!d of Te - , to --
.... !e 68
Equations (1.1) were solved for the £oilowin_ conditions:
Te F
(1) Te (having a 8 min. half-life) in equilibrium, _e e - Fe.
(o_ Dur[nr the transient_ at a point _ the reactor_ fission rate
DrODOf'tio,_is ! tb [,]. i'm_l _"_tl ....
h• _ i C! e
(3) Direct yield of Xe neglected, a = O_
The solutions for a step change in _th' from
le <°e _eJ
m0 to ¢1, are
Xe(t) 1 : _ 3(_i- _e) i -
Xe e - \X-_e- + (o_i -_k3)_e
rio 0
(i .2)
As t _ -,
Xee + u$i/ _e
These solutions are plotted in figure i, for 5 cases.
Case I. For cut-back to zero from _th = 4xi014' peak Xe build-up
is 18.4 times_ occurring at ii hours. Initial Xe reached at 60+ hours.
Case II. For cut-back to zero from _th : 2×1014, peak build-up is
9.7 times, occurring at ii hours. Initial Xe reached at 55 hours.
¢I I
Case III. For cut-back from _th = 4×i01_ to 4×1013 , _0 - I0' peak
build-up is 6 times, occurring at 4 hours. I_itial Xe reached at 40 hours.
Case IV. For cut-back from _th = 4×1014 to 2×1014 _i i
' _0 - 2J peak
build-up is 1.8 times_ occurring at i to 2 holrs. Initial Xe essen-
tially reached at 24 hours.
Case V. For Xe build-up on start-up at Pth = 4×i014_ at 7 hours
get half the build-up_ and at 24 hours equilf)rium Xe is essentially
obtained.
!
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1.2. Sm - LONG TERM TRANSIENTS
The decay and burnout chain for Sm 149, at any point in the core,
can be described as follows (ref. I):
mtt -a-Te]\N--aTJ
F
1 d fPm k + fpm k _-_e + c _
<Sm) (Sm) <Pmd-_d _ + _th $7 e = _th e
(i .3)
where conditions are taken with reference to any equilibrium condition,
"e, " and
F fission rate
decay constants of Nd and Pm, respectively
cross section of Sm _ 5×104 barns
ratio of direct yield of Pm to direct yield of Nd
Equations (1.3) were solved for the following conditions:
(i) Nd (having a 1.7 hr half-life) in equilibrium,
Nd F
Nd e Fe
(2) During the transient_ at a point in the reactor, fission rate
proportional to thermal flux,
F _ @th
Fe 9th e
,I
The solutions for a step change in _th_ from _0 to _l_ are
Pro(t) _I Pm 0 m7 -kst
- +
l%ne q)th e _Pe
[Sin0 I]- a q)it ( Oq_e _ (]_iO qPlV -kbti = - g + -g
As t -_ ®, if m I _ 0, then Sm(.) = Sm e.
As t _ _ if _I " 0, then Sm(_) + e
' Sme = \Smej k-_-"
L
>
- htl(1.4)
The solutions are plotte d in figure 2 fol 6 cases:
Case I. For cut-back to zero from _th = 4×i014_ Sm reaches a quasi-
equilibrium increase at i0 days of i + XS - 5.88 times.
Case II. For a cut-back to zero from _t_ = 2×1014' Sm reaches a
quasi-equilibrium increase at i0 days of 3.4 times.
mi i
Case IIl. For a cut-back from _th = 4xlC14 to A×1013 , _0 i0,
peak Sm build-up is 3.9 occurrinc at 4 days. Even at I0 days_ build-up
is 2.3 times.
Case IV. For a cut-back from _th = 4x101_
Sm build-up is 1.5S times occurring at 1.7 days.
return to initial value.
to 2×1014 , _i _ i
_0 2_ peak
Takes about I0 days to
Case V. For Sm build-up on start-up at _bh = 4xi014_ at 2.S days
get half-build-up_ and at 9 days equilibrium S_ is essentially reached.
Case VI. For Sm build-up on start-up at Pth = 4×1013' at 7 days
get half build-up.
!
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51.3 REACTIVITY EFFECTS OF Xe AND Sm
1.3.I Equilibrium Effects
The concentration of Xe_ in equilibrium, at any point in the core_
(Xe total yield)F e
is XS + _the For high thermal flux, a_th e >> k3 and equi-
librium Xe is almost uniform in the core. The concentration of Sm, in
(Sm total yield)F e
equilibrium, at any point in the core is and_ thus_
°_the
is almost uniform in the core. The reactivity effects of equilibrium
Xe and Sm were found in reference Z.
1.3.2 Transient Effects
The build-up of both Xe and Sm after a cut-back was shown to be
flux dependent. If the assumption is made that the reactivity effect
of the poison is proportional to its concentration at the point in the
core of average thermal flux, then using _th = _th_av in equations
(i.i) to (1.4), and on figures i and 2, allows us to set
xo
AK
Xee (-K-)equil. Xe
and
Sm (K_---)Sm
AK
Sme (£K-)equil. Sm
1.4 SUM OF Xe AND Sm LONG TERM EFFECTS
For the case of a cut-back to zero from _th = 4×1014' the total
reactivity effect of Xe and Sm is shown on figure 3. The above assump-
tions for the transient poison effects on reactivity were used with
(AK_ = 4 percent and (fkK) = i percent, which assumes
-K- quil. Xe -K equil. Sm
equilibrium Sm before shut-down. The figure shows the Sm build-up to
compensate for the Xe decay giving a slight minimum at 105 hours of
5.05 percent, slightly greater than the initial effect _ of 5 percent. If
cut-back occurs before equilibrium Sm is reached, its build-up is less.
An appropriate formula for its final value, valid if operating at high
flux at least one or two days before shut-do_, is SmO = i + _0
Sm 0 _---"
If shut-down occurs after operating at @0 = 4xi014 for 5 days; the re-
activity effect of Sm will approach 4.7 perc¢nt.
!
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2. - RESTART TIMES
The Xe build-up after a shut-down has serious consequences in the
operation of a high flux thermal reactor if continuity of operation is
desired. Ynadvertant scrams or ones due to a temporary difficulty must
be expected. The Xe build-up after a scram will be linear in time and
proportional to the operating flux before the scram. The minimum time
in which to stop the Xe rise is taken up by (i) a waiting period to as-
certain and correct the difficulty and to insert the rod drive, (2) the
time to withdraw the rods to near criticality, and (3) the time to in-
crease flux high enough to stop the Xe rise. The Xe build-up during
rod withdrawal is so large that, in order to restart, rod withdrawal
speeds much greater than that required or desired for normal start-ups
or normal operation are necessary. An analysis of restart ability and
its dependence on rod velocity and excess reactivity available is pre-
sented below.
2.1 SHORT-TERM Xe TRANSIENTS
Over times of one-half hour to one hour, the change in I decay is
very small and the change in Xe decay is small relative to the change
in Xe burnout. In this case, a simplified equation for Xe is
dXe {dXe_
d7 = \dt Jr + aXer_thr °XeCl_h + 0.003 (F - Fr)
where "r" is any convenient nearby (in time) reference condition.
If we assume that ZLK/K due to Xe is proportional to the Xe con-
/^Tr%
 eotr   oo aver  o due
to Xe, we get
i dP I fdP_ - -- aPe --
o dt = _k_/r + Pr_thr - P_th + i + a (_th - _th r)
(2.1)
where
Pe equilibrium effect at high flux
a ratio of direct yield of Xe to direct yield of Te
If reference condition is the equilibrium condition before scram,
and _th _ O, then
after - 1 + a
scram
where Pe and _th e are conditions before scram.
After restart, in order to stop Xe rise,
_th(at max. P) P__ . Pe
_the(before scram) = (i + a)Pmax. - ape _ _max. (2.3)
2.2 RESTART ANALYSIS
A qualitative picture of a restart is s]own on figure 4. The ex-
cessive reactivity required to restart is
(dP) _ Xl { _e _(_restart_l8kmax" - 8kbef°rescram= _-_ 0 wait + -7 + T Log _'_re_tart/_ _i
(2.4)
where
twait from scram to starting rod withdr_Lwal
xI rod position where period T is _irst reached
v rod velocity
T constant period of restart
_restart obtained from typical decay on 80 sec period to source level
of lO-S_e .
obtained from typical restart tra_isients
C
O
@restart
- 30 to 50
The assumption noted on figure 4 around peak Xe introduces a negligible
error.
In a typical start-up at constant rod s]_eed, the allowable period T
is reached subcri_ically, about T seconds ],efore criticality would be
reached if rods continued at constant speed. This assumption locates the
position, Xl_ where rods must be slowed down to maintain the allowable
period, T. The position of the rods at xI is thus obtained as
- 8k(xl) = o h + vhT (2.5)
O!
O_
!
o
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where 6k(x) is rod calibration used, figure 5. Figure 6 is the ideal-
ized rod calibration for reference use. _i is control rod effectiveness
at x I .
dP) The two-week cycle characteristic used of _-the and Pe andd-t 0' calculated from equation (2.2), is
Time in
cycle,
days
0
2
4
6
8
i0
_th e
3.21×1014
3.33
3.46
3.61
3.76
3.93
Pe,
percent
4:
3.96
3.94:
3.9
3.87
3.82
0
percent/min
0.22
.226
.233
.241
.25
.257
For assumed T_ twait _ v, and day of scram_ the excess reactitivity, be-
fore scram, required to restart was calculated using equation (2.4) and
(2.5), figure 5, and the above table. The results are shown in figures
7 to ii for a range of down times from i to 20 minutes and rod velocities
from 1.5 to 6 inch/minute.
Superposed on these curves are the reactivities available at each
AK
day with various assumed -_- in experiments. The maximum of experi-
AK
ments would give zero excess -_- at i0 days. The change in excess re-
activity available was assumed at 0.625 percent/day.
Figure 12 gives maximum down time at each day of operation and for
_K
various -_ in experiments, for a rod velocity of 3 inch/minute. Each
percent sacrificed in experiments is worth about i_ days extra operation
or 3 to 3.5 minutes extra down time. Three percent sacrificed in exper-
iments would give 2 minutes at 9.5 days and 13.5 minutes at 5 days.
I0
3. - MAXIMUM Xe BURNOUT RATE AFTER RESTART
A large concentration of Xe in the core represents a hazard as its
removal is a positive effect on reactivity. There are two mechanisms
for such removal; (i) Xe decay, and (2) Xe burnout. The decay of Xe is
always a slow process, but could be a hazard in the case of the reactor
going critical on Xe decay even with control rods inserted•
The burnout of Xe is an unstable phenomenon. The rate of Xe burn-
out is proportional to the product of the concentration of Xe and the
thermal flux. For normal values of both parameters, burnout effects
are manifested as an inherent reactor instability, as discussed in sec-
tion 6• On a nuclear excursion, burnout of _e can augment the accident,
as discussed in section i0. After a restart_ with Xe build-upj the pos-
sible burnout, even at normal flux levels, is a factor in setting con-
trol rod speeds• If the control rods cannot _eep up with burnout_ a
nuclear excursion will be started, and the only protection to the re-
actor is the scram• This incident would not give large power overshoots
if the reactor scrams. An analysis for the maximum Xe burnout rates
after a restart at normal flux levels is presented below.
!
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3.1 CASE I, RESTART ON Xe RISE
Using short-term Xe equation (2.1) with reference condition the
equilibrium condition before scram, and restarting at constant _th = @re'
we get .... a@re t
Pe_the aPe ( _the_ Ip Pe_the aPe ( _the_ ]P = _re + I _a i - @re / + 0 - @re - I + a i - _ /J_
Pe@the + __aPe i#i _ @the_P(large t) _ @re i + a @re /
• aP0_re I- Pe <I _the_Pe_the + (_-_--0 _0 - @re! ÷ P0@r-----e
(3 .i)
_0
O
!
O
O_
!
O
P
P0
Pe
aP e
l+a
A rough plot of this burnout is shown below:
_e P0
- (1 +a) _- - a
_re e
@e'small
Time
The time constant of these exponentials is i _ 14 minutes
O@re
(for @re = 4xi014), giving a settling time of about one hour for
@re = 4xi014- After one hour or so, the I and Xe decay effects will
cause (if P _ Pe) P * Pe over a period of one day or so.
The maximum rates of Xe burnout for case I are shown below:
MAXIMUM BURNOUt RATE, PERCENT MINUTE
CASE I. Pe = 4 PERCENT, @re = 4×1014
P0, q°e = @ re = 4× 1014 ee small
percent
8 0.288 %/rain. 0.56 _min.
20 1.15 1.45 *
• Pessimistic.
Restarting at large Xe build-ups is always hazardous. Another haz-
1
ardous case is when scram occurs after running at low @ (say _ _max.'
where almost normal Xe is present but I is decreased) and restarting at
_max." The greater the excess ZXK/K before scram, the greater the pos-
sible Xe burnout.
5.2 CASE II, RESTART ON Xe DECAY
Using short-term Xe equation (2.1), with reference condition,
@r = 0, and restarting at constant _th = @re, we get
12
P -- (_) ape
i dP +_
_re r i + a + 0 - _r----_ r
) aPeP(larget) dP +----
_re _ r i + a
2-0
dITt)max. = aP0_re I-I * + --
A rough plot of this burnout is shown below:
_P0 _r e
(S .2)
t_
!
i._
0
PO
Pe
0
I
Time
The time constant is
settling time _ i hour for
over one to two days.
i A 14 minutes fir _re = 4×1014 and the
_re
_re = 4×1014. After I hour, or so, P _ Pe
Maximum rates of Xe burnout for case II are shown below:
MAXIMUM BURNOUT RATE, PERCENT _/MINUTE
CASE II. @re = 4×i011
PO,
percent
8
2O
Percent/minut __
0.576
i .44
• 13
This case actually includes restarts around peak Xe build-up. The
-- = 1014
worst case_ possibly_ is operation_ before scram_ at about _th e
and restarting about i0 hours later at maximum Xe build-up.
O
i
3.3 ROD RATES REQUIRED
AK
An optimistic estimate of minimum rod -_- withdrawal rate (4:1 de-
crease in effectiveness) is I.S percent _---K/minute (for v = 3 in./min).
This is on the ragged edge of insuring control of Xe burnout at all
times. A higher speed insertion rate of at least 3 times the withdrawal
rate seems indicated.
14
4. - BASIC REACTOR KINETICS
4.1 KINETIC PARAMET_IS
The prompt neutron lifetime, temperature coefficient, and void
coefficient were discussed in reference 2. For the effective delayed
neutron fraction, references S and 4, the following formula_ consistent
with the group diffusion approximation, was used.
2 2
1 +
_i - i + L 2 B 2
fi
(4 .i)
where
effective delayed neutron fraction
yield of ith delayed neutron group
2 age of prompt neutrons averaged over fission spectrumL_
L_i age of ith delayed neutrons
B 2 total buckling of reactor
This effect is tabulated below for two buzklings, with L 2 = 64 cm 2
fp
• T_ , B 2 0 005405 B2i _'I = • = 0.00807
i
1 .'52.51 1.145 0.00099
2 57.2l 1.12 .00276
5 52.811.144 .00247
4 Z5.51 1.13 .00197
5 29.511.16 .000::504
B = 0.008494
 il il
1.2 0.001056
1.1661 .00288
1.1981 .00259
1.18 1 .00206
1.2251 .000321
I_ = O.0O8887
I
o
4.2 DIFFERENTIAL ANALYZER SETUP
For those studies, in this report, for which all the delayed neutron
groups were considered, a differential analyzer was used. The equations
that were solved_ reference 3, can be written:
15
!
- T +
dCi
d-Y-+ hci -- y
(4.2)
where
time dependence of flux
bk reactivity
_i effective delayed neutron fraction, _ = _i
Z prompt neutron lifetime
Bk _i 8k
The parameters of the above equations are T and T' or 7- and _i"
The equations were solved for _ equal to ratio of actual yields. Two
sets of cases were run: (i) One set for _ = iS Xl0 -5 seconds and
= 0.0085, (2) Second set for I = i0.2×i0 -S seconds and [ = 0.008S.
All the results can be generalized in terms of 8k/_ for the corre-
sponding %/[. For instance, the first set of runs can be applied to
Z = 13.2×10 -5 seconds and _ = 0.0078. The second set of runs can be
applied to Z = 9×i0 -S seconds and Z = 0.0075.
The stable reactor periods, based on equation (4.2), are shown on
figure i3 as a function of 8k/_ for two values of I/_, for reference
use.
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5. - CUT-BACKS
The effect of various cut-backs on flux level is shown on figure 14,
for scrams, reverses_ and set-back. These results were obtained on a
differential analyzer including the effects of five delayed neutron
groups. For scrams, the prompt drop is obtained in 0.25 to 0.5 second.
For a total of -30.0 percent z_/K, a cut-back to 2 percent is obtained
in 1.16 seconds. If only a total of -i0 percent ZXK/K is inserted_ it
takes II seconds to reduce flux level to 2 percent.
Cut-backs by reverses are very sensitive to reverse speeds. For a
reverse of 0.7 percent z_K/K/second, a one d_cade drop is obtained in 5
seconds at which time -3.5 percent Z_/K has been inserted. Immediate
recovery from this level is always possible if there were about 0.7 per-
cent ZXKZK excess before the reverse. The slower reverse, at 0.04 per-
cent ZkK/K/second, is only slightly more effective than a 20 second pe-
riod set-back.
!
O
O
!
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6. - REACTOR STABILITY
In normal operation, the inherent stability characteristics of the
reactor determine the ease or difficulty of operation in manual control
and the dependence on and requirements of the servo under automatic con-
trol. Xenon effects are always unstabilizing. The delayed neutrons and
the negative temperature coefficient are stabilizing influences. To in-
vesti[ate over-all stability, the combined system of basic reactor ki-
netics, temperature effects on reactivity, and Xe effects on reactivity
were studied analytically and presented below.
6.1 REACTOR KINETICS, 5 DELAY GROUPS
The linearized form of the reactor kinetic equations for the re-
sponse of flux to net reactivity (Sk), using operational notation, is
5
r](i +-[iio_) • 5k
fh_ _ i •5k = i
_0 [i 5
(i_) + ×i + i _i[i + (i_)n(a+ _ii_)
i=l I
(6.1)
and i
fractional yield
The equations were linearized around a "zero" critical condition,
.th
• . = i/k i is mean life of i delayed neutron group of effective
is prompt neutron lifetime. Also,
_i ' and Z
5
rl _. B_ + Z Z_._.
1 _i-1 i l--I
1 •
4 [ 5 average
I
i
= 12.474 seconds
the a i are all real and lie alternately between the _i] the smallest
one, a S _ _/_.
6.2 REACTOR KINETICS, I DELAY GROUP
The response equation is
a_9= 1 + '_i_ • 5k (6.Z)
_o (_+_)(i_)(1 + _ +_z__i_)
18
Equation (6.1) and (6.2) agree at high fTequencies (_0 =>V/Z).
agreement at low frequencies (_ < i/_i) we need _ = X-_i_i, and
= _av = 12.474 seconds, i
For
The time constants involved are 12.47 se(_onds and
= 12 to 17 milliseconds. Detailed study of equation (6.I)+
shows that the one delayed group approximatio_ is not too valid in the
intermediate frequency rangej except for crud_ approximations.
6.3 KINETICS DUE TO Xe
The linearized form of the short-term Xe equation is
f_P
i" (Pc- o.oo21•
_00
, forim
I +_
g@O
aP e
- 0.002 (6.3)1 +a
t
where P is - fii/K
i
> 14 minutes.
_0
effect due to Xe. The tine constant is
I
O
o_
6.4 KINETICS DUE TO TEMPERATURE
i+ u i i+ OmCmLl+ PcccL2 iv hI
Equation (12.13) which neglects time cons :ants< i0 milliseconds
can be put in form
h2 _
(Two _ Tin0 ) I + uL3 _wC w v
• __ + - • f_Tin
¢0 h2 u +u+ i
LSOwC w v v
(6.4)
The time constants involved are about 33.5 and 46.7 milliseconds.
6.5 BLOCK DIAGRAM
A block diagram showing the transfer functions for the linearized
responses of flux to reactivity (using one delayed neutron group), re-
activity effect of Xe to flux and to gross burnout, and reactivity
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effect of temperature to flux and to inlet water temperature is shownon
figure 15. The Xe responses are valid for 1/2 to i hour, temperature
responses have neglected time constants < i0 milliseconds, and -_ is
the temperature coefficient of reactivity.
O
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6.6 UNCONTROLLED REACTOR
Neglecting time constant < 46.7 milliseconds, the response of flux
6krods, ATin , and _ross burnout (Po) is
iv P0
(i+_[_0)(i+%) "[_krods-C_LSTin]-(i +_ico) ' d_ 0
O
!
o
O
_0 [_(Two - Tim0 ) +
O.O02-PO] + I_+0.OO2_P0+_(Two°TLno)(l+_oll_ico+[_+c_(Two_Tin0)] _(ic°)2a,0
(6.s)
The stability criterion is _(Tw 0 - Tin0) > P0 - 0.002. In our case,
m(Two - Tin O) _ 0.15 percent, while P0 _ 4 percent. Therefore the re-
actor is definitely unstable• There are also odd long term reversal
effects where increase of flux requires rod insertion, at least for
one hour or so until Xe and I decay effects come in. For example, a
i0 percent increase in flux requires, after initial transient,
6krods _ - 0.37 percent (for P0 = 4 percent).
6.7 REACTOR INSTABILITY
The stability parameters are (i) _0' (2) PO' and (3) _(Tw0 - Tin0).
The two normal modes of response (roots of denominator of eq. (6.5)) are
shown in the following tables. These modes are damped and undamped ex-
ponentials (nonoscillatory).
Case I. _0 = 4×1014' P0 = 4%, # = 0.85%, Tav = 12.47 sec
re(Two -, Tin0),
percent
0
• 0435
a .15
.3
Unstable mode,
sec
43.5
49.8
67
96,6
Stable mode_
sec
-53.2
-49.8
-42.5
-35.1
aApproximate condition at rated power.
2O
Case II. _0 = 4×I014' PO= 20_, _ = 0.8_, _av" 12.47 sec
(as during restart with maximumXe)
_(Two Tino) , Unstable mode, Stable mode,
sec sec
percent
0 16 -28
a.is 20.4 -26
aApproximate condition at rated power.
This Xe power instability is manifested as a slow, positive expo-
nential drift in flux level, increasing or decreasing. The temperature
coefficient of reactivity only increases the unstable period from 43 to
55 - 60 seconds in normal operation. The unstable period could be as
low as 16 seconds after a restart with maximum Xe build-up. On a re-
start, this period is also that which would develop, at first, if the
control rods do not keep up with Xe burnout.
It can be shown that the stable and unstable modes are perturbed
almost equally by any reactivity disturbance. For a pulse reactivity
disturbance, and PO = 4 percent, _0 = 4×i014_ and
_(Tw0 - Tino) = 0.0455 percent, the unstable transient, after the in-
itial pulse, is
[y"_ Tee] +s/50 Sec
• dt
5.85 kdist%
For example, a 0.5 percent pulse lasting i sec(,nd would give a 50 per-
cent overshoot in about 2._ minutes.
t_
!
o
t_
7. - CONTROLLED REACTOR
A complete investigation of the servocontrolled reactor requires
an analogue study simulating the reactor kinetics and servocharacteris-
tics in detail. Some of the general requirements on regulating rod
speed and range and limitations in controllability because the regula-
ting rod speed and range must be limited, due to the hazard involved on
servo failure, can be deduced from general considerations• An analysis
for stability, control on constant period set=backs_ and control of re-
activity disturbances follows•
7.1 CONSTANT PERIOD SET-BACK
-t/T
The behavior of the setting is _0_ where T is period of
set-back• Neglecting the time constants in control_ or assuming perfect
control, the rod transient to obtain this set-back, over a few minutes_
is
-_ (¢-t/T-t/_)5krods = T - _
= _
(Skr°ds) max • T -
which occurs at
• T T
tmax- - T • log-
-
(d_ 5krods)max. = - _/T
(7.1)
A typical transient is shown below:
t
5krods max.
--(
For Xe
effects-_
, _
I _I I Time
I " 4T
Z2
A table of regulating rod speed and range requirements_ for con-
stant period set-backs is given below. These are pessimistic values as
the small Xe rise in this time interval would reduce these speed and
range requirements.
Set-back Itmax., Required range
period_ sec t,_Skrods) ,
sec max.
percent
20 15.6
90 28.5
Required speed
(d 5krods) max.
percent/sec
-0.243 -0.05
-.086 -.01
Using one average delayed neutron group indic_tes that_ to maintain a
constant period set-back, there is a maximum znsertion of the regulating
rod after which the rod will withdraw and approach its original position.
The table shows that the regulating rod speed is adequate for set-backs
but that the range required for a 20 second p,_riod set-back may be
critical.
!
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7.2 STABILITY
If a pure integral controller is placed _round the system (block
diagram, fig. 15), that is
F °sot5krods - i_[_ 0 - q
the stability criterion on controlled system is
K > oPo_o =
0.0048 %/sec for PO = 4%
0.024 %/sec for PO = 20%
If the gain is set so that a 17.5 percent error in _ will give maximum
rod velocity, then stability requires
(_t 5krods)max. >
0.00084 %/sec for PO = 4%
0.0042 %/sec flor PO = 20%
A regulating rod can easily meet this requirement. One shim rod would
be marginal in this regard. A gain (K) of 5.4 percent/second, which is
140 times that required to stabilize Xe in the worst condition, seems
reasonable for a regulating rod.
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A rough estimate for the upper limit on gain for stability can be
deduced from the following assumptions:
(i) Delayed neutrons act as a constant source at these relatively
high frequencies.
(2) Pure integral control action_ perfect servoaction at the fre-
quencies of interest.
(S) Small reactivities involved (Sk << _).
(4) Xe and temperature neglected at these relatively high
frequencies.
The response of flux to _s and 5k disturbance is
K(_) + im 5kdist
s
_0 K + Bin + l(i_) 2
(7.2)
If critical damping is the effective stability limit then, the stability
criterion is
[2
K < _ = 20 _Isec
If K << 80 percent/second_ the denominator of the above responses (eq.
(7.2)) factors into K_ + _ im)(l + _ i_)_ _ = 0.25 second (forK
K = 5.4 percent/sec); _ = 10.6 milliseconds.
7.5 CONTROLLED RESPONSES
For the pure integral controller, the controlled responses, valid
for one minute or so before Xe effects come in, of flux and rod position
to flux setting and reactivity disturbances are
i "Skdists
5krods =
i_ + _ im_
/
z_
_0
£_ + _- 5kdist
s
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Where one average delayed neutron group was _sed and
K >> _/_ _ 0.07 percent/second. There are t_ree time constants involved:
(i) the mean life of delayed neutrons, • = 15.67 seconds, (2) the time
constant of control, _/K = 0.25 second for K = 3.4 percent/second, and
(3) the time constant of the prompt neutron _ffect,
_/8 = 10.6 milliseconds. The additional effect of the velocity limit of
the regulating rod, approximately 0.6 percent/second, must be considered.
For a reactivity disturbance above a frequency of .K/_ there is
, 5k
little control action. Also, for a frequenc;r above max. there is
15kdistl
little control action because of the velocit; r limit on regulating rod.
K 5kmax.
For these limits to occur simultaneously, _ " lllSkdistl" Using
5_ax• = 0.6 percent/second, 15kdistl = 0.15 percent gives
K radians
-- = 4 , as the essential upper frequency which can be controlled•
second
For this set of parameters, a servofrequency response of 3 to 5 cps seems
adequate. Such a servo would not control th_ prompt neutron effects•
For a step reactivity disturbance_ the ;eak flux would be the irre-
ducible (almost) prompl rise. The maximum red velocity during the tran-
K
sient would be _ 5kdist. The flux would return to its original value
on an exponential with a time constant _/K. For a 5kdist=0.15 percent,
and K 4 radians
= second ' the maximum rod velocit_ would be 0.6 percent/second
and the settling time for the transient, about 48/K, would be about one
second•
!
o
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8. - START-UP ACCIDENT
It was shown in sections 2 and S that the Xe build-up and burnout
rates sets minimum values of control rod speeds in order to restart
after a recent shut-down and to insure control of Xe burnout at all
times. The maximum allowable rod rates are set by reference to the
start-up accident, where it is assumed that all control rods are being
withdrawn at their maximum possible speeds and the reactor is protected
only by a level scram. It is well known that the higher the rate of in-
sertion of reactivity the shorter the period at any level and thus the
larger the overshoot after the level scram. It is shown below that the
peak flux_ or peak specific power, is the major consideration for these
accidents. An analysis for the start-up accident is given below.
8.1 CRITERION ON EXCURSION
As shown in section 12, in neglecting time constants of the order
of 6.S milliseconds there is a static correspondence between surface
heat flux and surface temperature, both lagging the heat release with a
time constant of 46 milliseconds at normal conditions. On nucleate boil-
ing, this lag decreases considerably. If, for the start-up accident
with periods greater than 40 milliseconds and overshoots which must be
in nucleate boiling, this lag is neglected_ the analysis would be
slightly pessimistic as any additional heat stored would attenuate peak
surface heat flux and surface temperature, raising the temperature at
center of plate which would be (for mild overshoots) well below melting
anyway.
Thus_ the start-up accident excursions can be considered as follow-
ing the static curve of surface heat flux versus surface temperature. A
safe criterion for this accident is that the peak heat flux be below the
burnout heat flux. From existing burnout data a value for burnout heat
flux of 2.2xi06 Btu/hour square feet appears to be a conservative
limit. This value would allow an overshoot to 2.5 times rated power.
Pressure build-up on nucleate boiling, for the periods involved in the
start-up accident_ would not be harmful, reference E.
8.2 KINETICS DURING SCRAM
If, previous to scram_ flux has increased over a wide range fairly
rapidly so that the relative contribution of neutrons from the delayed
emitters is small, then reactor kinetics can be written
__) 8k - Skr
Cdt r
where "r" is any convenient nearby (in time) reference condition.
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then
For reference condition at dropping of rods (t = 0), and
S
$k - 6kdrop = - _ gl 2
_max. occurs when
and
log __9__ _ t _gt3
_drop Tdrop E_
t 2 = 2_
SgTdro p
log@ma___x-_ = 2 # 2_/_ _-_
• mdrop 5Tdrop \Sgrdrop_
where T is period and s is rod effectiveness.
plotted in figure 16, for _ = 9×10 -5 seconds
(8.2)
This equation is
and a range of "s."
8.3 KINETICS DURING DEAD TIME
Using equation (8.1), reference conditio_ at scram signal (t = 0),
and 8k - 5kss = Rt, we get
log _drop = At
ess Tss  t[t-- +_At 2 =_-
__l +R
Tdro p = Ts s _ At
(8.3)
where
R accident rate (or rod rate)
At dead time
For any given _, s, R, and At we need only the period at the
scram signal level to calculate the overshoot over that level, using
equations (8.2) and (8.3).
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8.4 KINETICS BEFORE SCRAM SIGNAL
8.4.1 Newson Analysis (ref. 5)
The basic reactor kinetics is described by
dO
z (sk- + hci +s
i
If we let
F'ZXiCi S ]
_l + _ _ = v(t)> 0
then
d_ 5k-
+ _(t)
_dt
Starting the analysis when the accident has progressed to prompt
critical, that is, at t = O, _ = _pc_ and 5k - _ = Rt. Then
Q_s___{s= Rt2ss _ tss
log _pc 2---_+ v(t)dt
_0
i Rtss
+ _(tss)
Tss
Eliminating tss in above equations gives
2 _ tsslog _pc_S-_S= __2R[T_ss - v (tss)] + v (t)dt
_0
The approximate behavior of v(t) is given below:
J
,(t)
1
T
pc
v(t) > 0
Time
(8.4)
(8.5)
(8.6)
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The detailed nature of this function alL)ws us to write equation(8.6) as
_ss Z
log_>_
_pc 2RT 2
ss
and since
_pc
log _initial
>0
Minimum possible period at scram signal =
i
2
R log _initialJ
(8.7)
This minimum possible period will give the maximum possible over-
shoot over the scram signal level. The above equation is plotted in
figure 17 for _ = 9×10 -5 seconds over a rang6 of R.
i
O
8.4.2 Initial Level Close to Scram Level
The reactor kinetic equations with 5 delayed neutron groups were
solved on a differential analyzer for two cases: (i) Constant rod with-
drawal at 0.i percent/second, and (2) 0.5 percsnt step plus a constant
rod rate of 0.I percent/second. This simulate3 the worst that the rods
can do, starting, for example, in the power raage.
The results are plotted in figure 17 and {iso on figure 22. It is
_ss
seen that for of, for example, i00, the Newson-type analysis
_initial
is far too pessimistic, giving a period at scr_m of i00 milliseconds
when the actual period is about 400 millisecon]s.
8.5 TOTAL OVERSHOOTS
Combining equations (8.2) and (8.3), the _otal overshoot over the
scram signal level can be written
log _max. 2 C 2Z ._ At P_t 2 2 [ 2_ RA
(8.8)
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The first and second terms on the right hand side of the previous equa-
tion give the total overshoot under the assumption that the period does
not change during the dead time. The error involved using this assump-
tion, is the magnitude of the third and fourth terms of equation (8.8).
For the start-up accident, this error is less than 15 percent in _max."
The overshoots given below were calculated using the assumption that the
period changesvery little during the dead time duration. Periods at
scram are obtained from figure 17. The first term of equation (8.8) is
plotted in figure 16.
The total overshoots over the scram signal level is plotted in fig-
_ss
ure 18, as a function of dead time, for various values, using
_initial
the Newson-type analysis for the large range accidents and the actual
transients for the small range accidents. Figure 17 showedthe boundary
@ss
value between the two approaches to be about 104. A table
_initial
of somespecific start-up accidents is given below.
STARTUPACCIDENTS
ERodvelocity_ 3 in./min; rod effectiveness, 2 percent _k/in.]
Initial
level
]0-14 _f
10 -14 _f
_]0 -14 @f
Accident conditions
Scram
signal
level
Ratio of
scram
signal to
initial
level
i0 II
1015
1.5XlO 14
2.25
i000
4000
Dead time
in scram
80 Millisec
8O
4O
80 Millisec
8O
4O
I Period at
scram
signal
level
42 Millisec
39
37
1.8 Sec
170 Millisec
lO0
Ratio of
peak
level
to scram
signal
level
9.7
12
4.6
1.66
1.66
Peak
level
10 -2 @f
1.2 @f
6.9 @f
_Slow scram inoperative, four simultaneous failures.
Note: If period scram operates with dead time < 5 sec then peak
level always < 2.5 @f.
3O
For the accident beginning at a very low source level and scramming
at the lowest protection level of 10-3 @f, where @f is the rated power
level, the period at scram would be 42 millis_conds. Using a dead time
of 80 milliseconds for this slow scram gives _.inovershoot of 9.7 times,
which is very safe. If we consider the protection level not acting until
i0 -I rated power, the period at scram would be 39 milliseconds and the
overshoot 12 times which is still very safe. If the slow scram protec-
tion does not act at all, the minimumperiod at scram.@ouldbe 37 milli-
seconds and, with a dead time in the fast scram of 40 milliseconds, the
peak power would be 6.9 times rated. This accident involves four simul-
tanious failures: uncontrolled rod withdrawal, failure of the slow scram
system and its back-up, and failure of the period scram. Also, as dis-
cussed in reference 2, periods of 37 millisec_nds are controllable by the
self-regulating features of the reactor, whic}_are not included in this
analysis. Also, the conservative limit on pe_k power of 2.5 times rated
is the static burn-out limit; allowable trans:ent peaks being much
higher.
In the power range, above 10-3 rated power, the protection will be
very c_ose whereby the scram level should not exceed the operating level
by more than 2.25. The minimumperiod that cc.uld develop from a control
rod withdrawal would be 1.8 sec. If this pro_.ection takes a level rise
of as muchas i000 to act, instead of 2.25, t_e period at scram would be
170 milliseconds and the excursion would be s_fe. The fast level scram,
set at 1.5 @f with a dead time less than 40 milliseconds, is always in
effect. If the slow scram protection does no_ act at all, a level rise
of as muchas 4000 would give a period of i00 milliseconds, which, for
the fast scram would give a safe peak power.
All cases discussed above were for the p_riod scram inoperative.
If only the period scram operates with a dead time less than 3 seconds,
then the excursions for any startup accident _ould be safe.
The drive system providing the rod insertion speed of 9 in./min is
designed to insure one-directional operation. Even if this speed should
somehowbecomeeffective as a withdrawal, and uncontrolled withdrawal
should occur, the scram system would keep the excursions safe. In addi-
tion, the minimumperiod that can develop fro_ this higher rod speed,
about 21 milliseconds, can be controlled by the self-regulation of the
reactor as discussed in reference 2.
|
O
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9. - C0NTR0_ILITY OF LARGE ACCIDENTAL
REACTIVITY INSERTIONS
In order to set the minimum requirements on the safety system and
the allowable reactivity insertions that can be safely handled by this
system, it is necessary to understand the behavior of the reactor in re-
sponse to the accident and the corrective action of the control system.
The basic reactor kinetic equations are of 6th or 7th order and are amen-
able to analysis for only a few special cases. An understanding of all
the implications of such an equation is best obtained by solving for a
wide variety of special cases using machine methods.
A differential analyzer was used to solve the equations describing
a number of accidental reactivity insertions and the subsequent correc-
tive action of the control safety system. Both step and ramp reactivity
insertions were made and both scram and reverse actions were studied for
a range of dead times, control rod effectiveness, rod speeds, accident
rates and amounts, and levels of safety signal.
9.1 ONE PERCENT ACCIDENTS - WITH SCRAMS
Figure 19 gives peak flux for a i percent step 2_K/K accident, with
scram signal set at _0 = 1.5, as a function of dead time and rod ef-
fectiveness. The peaks are sensitive to both parameters. 0nly the very
best conditions for scram contain this accident. But, if the accident
progresses ramp-wise, then, for a rather poor scram condition, an acci-
dent ramp time of 0.2 second would reduce peak _ from 9.3 _0 to 3 _0"
In this case, the entire i percent of accident was not involved. For
such large accidents, the rate of ZkK/K insertion is of utmost impor-
tance and is more fully discussed later.
9.2 FIVE TENTHS PERCENT STEP ACCIDENTS
Figure 20 shows that scrams can easily contain this accident. Slow
reverses, like 0.04 percent/second, are not effective. Peak flux is very
sensitive to reverse rates up to about 0.15 percent/second; little Im-
provement is obtained above this speed. The dead time is of secondary
importance.
9.S RAMP-WISE ACCIDENTS
Figure 21 shows peak flux plotted against the accident ZhK/K inser-
tion rate, which continues indefinitely, for various scrams and reverses;
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a poor scram condition assumed. Accident rates of 5 percent/second are
contained. A reverse rate of 5 percent/seconc can handle accident rates
of 2 percent/second. A reverse rate of 0.7 p_rcent/second can handle
accident rates of 0.5 percent/second.
9.4 CONTINUEDREACTIVITYINSERTIONAT CONSTANTRATE
All the previous accidents started at full power with a reverse
signal at 1.2 _f or a scram signal at 1.5 ¢f. It is more dangerous, if
the accident starts well below the correction signal level. For such
accidents, cases were run of continued Z_£/K insertion at constant rates_
the results are shownon figures 22, 25, and 24. Figure 22 was used for
the start-up accident analysis.
The higher the accident rate, the lower the period at any level.
For corrections tripped by a level signal, figure 23 gives the period at
that signal. The overshoots can be found analytically from the period,
for most cases, using equation (8.1) for both scrams and fast reverses.
For corrections tripped by a period signal, figure 23 gives level at that
signal. For accident rates greater than about i percent 8k/second, the
i second period signal is obtained immediately.
_J
O
9.5 PERIOD AGAINST REACTIVITY CONSTANT
REACTIVITY INSERTION R_TES
Figure 25 and 26 show period as a functiol of 6k for various con-
stant rates of _k insertion. Also shown, is the stable period, which
would be obtained for very slow rates. The fa_ter the reactivity rate,
the smaller the period at any reactivity. All the curves approach the
sta_le period curve as higher reactivities are reached. These figures
also prove the accuracy of the differential an_Llyzer calculations.
9.6 CONTROLLABLE ACCIDEIrrS
One of the basic criterions on the design of the reactor, experiment
and control systems is that no possible accidmlt can introduce changes in
reactivity which cannot be safely handled by tile reactor control system.
The basic safety feature of the control system is the level fast scram
which is set to trip at a level 50 percent or less above the maximum re-
actor operating level required for the particular reactor cycle. This
saftey trip is backed up by the one second period fast scram, the inter-
mediate level slow scrams, as well as reverses and set-backs which are
triggered at the first indications of malfunction.
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Figure 16 can be used to find the minimum allowable period at the
scram signal power level. In order to relate these restrictions on re-
actor periods to allowable reactivity insertions, the transient reactor
periods must be considered as well as the stable periods. For step or
ramp-wise insertions of reactivity, the transient periods are always
smaller than the ultimate stable period. To obtain these effects, the
reactor kinetic equations, using 5 delayed neutron groups, were solved
on a differential analyzer for cases of continued insertion of reactivity
at constant rates. The results were shown on figures 23 to 26.
In general, the period at the scram signal is determined by the
level at the start of the accident, the rate of reactivity insertion,
and the total reactivity inserted. For any reactivity insertion rate,
figure 2S shows that the period decreases continuously until the total
reactivity is inserted. At this time the period is the minimum for the
transient as, past this point, the period would increase toward the
stable period corresponding to the total reactivity inserted. If the
smallest allowable period during the transient is set according to fig-
ure !6, which only specifies minimum periods at scram, a definitely safe
and pessimistic relation between reactivity insertion rate and total re-
activity inserted can be obtained from figure 25. These limitations on
reactivity, which are independent of the power level at which the acci-
dent starts, are shown on figure 27.
Ramp-wise accidents are assumed: Each such accident is represented
by a point on figure 27 corresponding to the reactivity and time at the
corner of the ramp. Accidents which so map into a point below the curve
under consideration can 0e safely handled by the control system for that
curve. The curves apply to the least favorable power levels at the start
of the accident, up to the 60 mw power level, and for the least effective
control rod position, and for the conservative criterion on any excursion
that the peak power be less than 2.S times rated.
If only the level fast scram system is operative, a step of 0.5 per-
cent Sk or a slow insertion up to 0.9 percent Sk is always control-
lable. If only the set-point level scram system is operative, a reactiv-
ity insertion of I.£ percent in 0.G second is always controllable. If
only the one second period scram system is operative, with a dead time
less than 40 milliseconds, a reactivity insertion of I.SS percent in 0.23
second is always controllable.
It is emphasized that these limits are for the least favorable power
levels at the start of the accident. If, for example, considering the
fact scram only is operative 7 a 2 percent Sk per second accident starts
at power levels greater than 20 mw, the reactor scrams before the limit-
ing total reactivity of 0.74 percent is inserted. If the same accident
starts at power levels less than 20 mw, then a somewhat larger total in-
sertion of reactivity is controllable as the reactor scrams after the
minimum period of the transient. If the accident starts at 60 mw, a re-
activity insertion rate of 4 to S percent _k per second is controllable.
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i0. - Xe BURNOUT ON NUCLEAR EXCURSION
As noted in section 5_ the Xe in the cor_ is an ever-present hazard
because it can be burned out in an unstable manner at appreciable rates.
The possibility of burning out a large fraction of this Xe in a short
time requires thorough study. An analysis of this Xe burnout on a nuclear
excursion is given below.
i0.i GENERAL EXCURS_0N
Using the short-term Xe equation (2.1)_ with reference condition at
start of run-away, t = 0_ and assumin6
]_th >> Po_th 0 +
aP e
i +a (_th - _h O) + _ _ 0
we _et
dP
= - (lO.l)
whose solution is
t
P
PO
(I0.2)
which gives the burnout as a function of nuclear energy release only.
For any average energy per unit volume released_ the worst burnout is
when the correspondin_ _th is greatest - for our case_ at the end of
the lO-day cycle. Assuming _th = 4×1014 corresponds to 60 megawatts
for the full core, equation (10.2) becomes
p_ SxlO 4 \MW _ec] (io.3)
where E(t) is nuclear enerL_ released on the _xcursion for the full core.
This equation is plotted in figure 28. I_ run-away starts with
equilibrium Xe (P0 = 4 percent), then it takes a 6700 megawatt seconds
excursion to add 0.S percent reactivity. In t_e worst case_ if run-away
starts after a restart_ where P0 may reach a_ high as 20 percent, then
!
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a 1250 megawatt seconds excursion will add 0.5 percent reactivity. It
is interesting to note that in general_ the maximum burn-up rate
" I d'_th
(at P _ 0) occurs when _ = a_th , but, as seen below, about 2/5
_th dt
of the Xe would have already been burned out.
O
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where
Let
where
and
1,0.2 CONSTANT PERIOD EXCURSION (REF. 6)
In this case,
_th = _th0 _t/T
T is constant period of excursion. Equation (10.2) becomes
P -°T_th0 (_t/T- i) -oT (_th-_thO) -oT_th
P0 _ = _ -_
t =t I be time at maximum burnout rate = 0).
t-t I t-t I
T T
P _ -_ + oT_th 0 - -
PO _
Then_
t-t I
T
o_2_th =
 th(x)dx=
t-t I t-t I
T -- - T
- oT_th 0
tI
T
oT_th 0 = 0T_th I = I
-Po -Po
T i- oT_ 0 T_
(10.4)
(IO.S)
_6
and
= _ - _
1
It is seen that _th0; condition at start of run-away, is not important
for these Xe burnout effects.
Equation (10.S) is plotted in figure 29. this transient is for a
constant period. But; as burnout progresses; the period will decrease
and the sharp rise in the curve at about 2 periods before the maximum
burnout rate; indicates that the flux at this point_
-- i 4.$2xi016
_th _ -- = neutrons/cm 2 sec and
_T_ 2 (T/see)
energy release = 6770 megawatt seconds; would b_ a trigger to burnout
all the Xe in much less than 3 periods.
!
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ii. - HAZARDS DUE TO REGULATING ROD
I
The regulating rod will be calibrated to insure reactivity worth of
less than 0.6 percent _k. The rod is velocity limited to give full
travel in about one second. This would give for fulff travel at maximum
speed a minimum transient period of _00 milliseconds_ figure 25, and a
stable period of 1.7 second_ which is not at all hazardous. The hazard
in the regulating rod is shown on figure 27 for full travel of 0.6 per-
cent _k in one second. The regulating rod could be worth as much as
0.87 percent _k for only the level fast scram system operative or as
much as 1.2 percent _k for only the set-point level scram system oper-
ative and still be safe.
212. - TRANSIENT HEAT TRANSFfR ANALYSIS
The basic hazard in the operation of a reactor using MTR type fuel
plates can i e traced to the mecl_anism of trarsient heat transfer in the
plates and to the coolant. This mechanism determines allowable excur-
sions in terms of peak values or minimtun periods to avoid damage or se-
vere accidents caused by pressure surgesj burnout_ and melting.
In the analysis that follows_ the equations describing transient
heat conduction in the meat and clad were exactly solved in the fre-
quency, or operational_ domain. Expansion of the operators gives the
more useful lumped parameter form for the responses. A fairly general
model for the transient heat transfer to the _oolant was then used and
the two sets of equations then combined_ oper_tionally, give the net re-
sponses of surface heat flux_ plate temperatu_es_ and coolant tempera-
tures to nuclear energy release rate and inle_ coolant temperature.
!
o
12.1 HEAT CONDUCTION IN FU_L PLATE
Meat Clad
I
I
I
where
x=0 x=L I y=L2
y=O
12.1.1 Meat
The partial differential equation for transient heat conduction is
_Tm _2T m Qm _
C_m _x 2 _mCm
(IZ.I)
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O
_q
!
and
Usinc a frequency response approach_ let
Qm _ G_i_tl
OmC m
Tm = F_ i_t
then equation (12.1) becomes
i_F = _mFxx + G
whose solution with
where
Fx(O)= o is
F = A(_ rx + _-rx)
2 i_
r -
m
(12.2)
(12.3)
(12.4)
12.1.2 Clad
where
The partial differential equation for transient heat conduction is
_T c _2T c "
_t--= _c _y2
(12.5)
Let T = H_ i_t, then equation (12.S) becomes
C
whose solution is
where
:_H= _ H (:2.6)
c y-y
H = B_ sy + CC sy
2 i_
S ------
_C
) (12.7)
'!0
12.1.3 Boundary Condi_ ions
The continuity of temperat_e and heat flux gives
F(Ll) _ _(o)
_Fx(Ll)=ko_(O)J
and from equations (12.4) and (12.7) we get
_rLl-rL0/B+C= +_ _Gi_
B - C _ A rLl - e
KcS
{kmr_ { Omcmkm_ 2 •
As\k-y/=\O Ockc/1 for our case_ then
rL I • _
2B = 2Ae + G/i_ l
>
-rLl |
2C 2A_ + G/il)
12.1.4 Fuel Plate Transient Heat Conduction
Transfer Functions
Using equation (12.7) and (12.8) to eliminate
the _-eneral transient responses_
T
surface
(12.8)
A, B_ and C we get
sinh(rLl) 1 Qm +
- sinh(rL 1 + sL2) i-_ _nc---_ s _Y surface
!
o
c_
T(0): [1 sinh sL2 ] (_-_) _csinh(sL 2 + rL I) "
+
s s nh(sL 2 + rL I) surface
(12.9)
relating the temperatures at the surface and center of plate to the heat
released and to the temperature gradient at the surface.
OI
_0
I
0
o
41
Expanding equation (12.9), we o+_rain the _nal_ lumped parameter
form for the responses as follows:
im (+_iml2 1
+_--.
('°mCmLl + +cCcL2) d--{Tsurface | i + Tim + _ " CLIQm) +
I.. -"g- .s, +""
I++ iI+ --2--+ 4'. kc _YY surface+ira _ +.
+-%--+ 5:
(12.10)
where
2
LI
= 0.00122 second
LI 2+
= + = 0.008S6 second
The largest time constant involved ('_/2) is 4.18 milliseconds. The
lumped parameter form for the response of the temperature at the center
of the plate can be obtained in a similar manner.
12.2 HEAT TRANSFER TO COOLANT
Assuming:
Clad Water
_ L 5
v
(velocity)
(i) Temperature rise of water is linear in direction of flow.
(2) Heat transfer to water is of form (hlTsurfac e - h2Twater).
! 2
The responses of the heat flux through the plate surface and the
water temperature to the surface temperature of the plate and the inlet
water temperature are
f_T_ i_ + hlTsurface - u h2Tinle t
 ,W)s
-kc urface ic0 + v + h2
u L3owc w
hl v
u q inlet
T w = L30wCw Tsurface +-
i_ +v + h2
u L 30wCw
(12.11)
h 7.3
L3owc w see
for h = 8000 Btu/(hr)(ft2)(°F)(normal)
3OV
for v = 30 ft/sec, u = I ft
u sec
(u)The largest time constant involved is 33.3 milliseconds, v ' the transit
time to the center of the core.
I
_-J
o
12.3 COMBINED TRANSFER FUN_TIONS
12.3.1 Surface Heat Flux and Temperature Responses
We will neFlect 4 millisecond time constants in equation (12.10),
L30wCw a < 6.55 milliseconds in
and neglect time constants like h2 + v / _ =
%_cw u/
equation (12.11). The 6.t3 millisecond time _onstant corresponds to
h 2 = oO00_ arid h 2 (effect of water temperature on heat transfer) prob-
ably decreases on uucleate boilin;i. We theu _et_ at constant Tinlet_
hlTsurface = - Kc (_y) =
sur face
Ll%
amCmL I + OcCcL2)
i + \ hl i_
(12.12)
4%
bO
O
Thus, neglecting time constants of order 6.53 milliseconds, there
is a static correspondence between surface heat flux and temperature and
_oth lag heat release with time constant,
OmCmLl + OcCcL 2
hI
= 46.7 milliseconds for hI = 8000 (normal)
On nucleate toiling this lag would decrease considerably
O
_O
!
O
C)
12.3.2 Coolant Temperature Responses
Neglecting about i0 millisecond time constants, responses of water
temperature are
u LI Qm
v LS OwC w
1 +-- i 1 + i
v hI
u
l+ ..... V
LsPwCw .
h2 u + u " Tin
LsOwC w v v
The coolant temperature response to nuclear energy release rate is a
double la£ with time constants of 33 milliseconds and 47 milliseconds
in normal operation. The coolant temperature response to its inlet
temperature is a lag with a time constant of about 27 milliseconds in
normal opera t_ on.
(12.13)
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II. FINAL REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS
REACTOR SAFETY PROGRAM*
By S. Hoenig, E. Saleme, and F. B. Porzel
June 30, 1956
I. INTRODUCTION
This analysis was done in response to a request by the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for a safety analysis on a proposed
nuclear reactor facility, to be constructed at Plum Brook Ordnance Works_
Ohio. The major requirement was that the gas-tlght shell must remain integral
under an internal explosion without compromising the value of the reactor as
a research tool.
The purpose of this study is to design the containment structure of
the reactor so it remains integral and gas-tight under the explosion of h00
pounds of TNT (equivalent) at the center of the reactor.
Major recommendations were made to NACA for increasing the thickness
of the reactor floor and the 70-foot wall. With these changes and other
detailed modifications worked out in Joint meetings between F. B. Porzel and
8. A. Hoenlng of Armour Research Foundation, and J. Turk and S. Muslin of
NACA, the reactor was adjudged reasonably safe.
Details of the analysis and drawings of the final design configuration
are in the analysis section of the report. Section D, added at the request of
NACA, gives approximate safety factors for the final design.
It must be recognized that in any design the actual safety can only be
ascertained within certain limits. In any complex engineering structure
there are possible sequences of design and construction modifications which
could lead to unexpected failure. The attempt to completely analyze and
prevent such failures would result in a delay of years and perhaps in impossible
designs. In the authors' opinion the reactor is safe on the basis of the
best reasonable analysis that can, at the present, be made.
In the analysis, &00 pounds of TNT was assumed to explode at a location
on the centerline of the reactor, ten feet from the bottom. The effects of
base surge, the shock wave, and final gas pressure on the top, bottom, and
sides of the gas-tight shell were taken into account. The energy required to
crush concrete and the equation of state for solids like concrete is developed
in some detail.
*This report is reproduced herein as originally published by the Armour
Research Foundation, Illinois Institute of Technology_ with no changes.
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II. ANALYS IS
A, Basic Formulas
Explosive en_rKy, equivalent to 400 pounds of TNT, was assumed
to have been rt_leased instantaneously in the reactor tank ten feet from the
bottom, The explosive pressures in water were calculated from a wldely-used
equation given in Cole's "Underwater Explosions "_l) where
J _
_.____ 1.13
P = 2.16 I04 (i)
P = peak pressure, psi
W = weight of charge, pounds of TNT
R = distance, feet
The other state variables behind the shock may be obtained from
the solution of the continuity and momentum conl,ervatlon laws as
where
u2 P1 P 2 (2)
_ - O V
V V 1 Oo
2
u = (PI Po ) (Vo " V I) (3)
u = flow velocity behind shoc}, wave, ft/sec
U : shock velocity, ft/sec
P = oressure ahead of shock w_ve, psf
C
P1 = pressure behind shock wav_, psf
V = specific volume ahead of _hock wave,o
ft 4
2lb. sec
ft 4
V I = specific volume behind sh(ck wave, 2
lb sec
The general adlabat for liquids and solids was 6ssumed to have the form
(See Allis & Herlin
I
O
(I) R. H. Cole, Underwater Explosions, Princet(n University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey; 19_8
(2) W. A!lis & M. Herlin; Thermodynamics and P_ysics of Matter, McGraw
Hill, Inc., New York, 1952
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(a + bP) I/b V = C (constant) (4)
for water a _ 21,000 for P in bars
b _ 7
If th0 shock wave is reflected from a wall, the pressures behind it are ob-
tained from
(P2 V2 P V
- i) (i - _l ) = (i - o) (,_2 . i) (5)PI VI
P2 = pressure behind reflected shock wave, psf
ft 4
V2 = specific volume behind reflected shock wave_ ib-sec 2
Now P1 >>> P for the cases under study and the rlght-hand side of theO
equation becomes _(_° - 1). The equation is then solved by an iteration
V 1
procedure.
B. Bottom of Tank
The shock wave proceeding downward reflects at the bottom of the tank
and the reflected pressures are about 30,000 psi. At thls pressure the plug
fails immediately and the crushed fragments are set into motion by the shock
wave.
To obtain the flow velocity behind the shock wave in the concrete,
we can write the equation of state for concrete, Just as we did for water, as
(a+ bP) I/b V = C (Eq. 4)
)i/b
and dividing by (a+ bP ° _= C
v+ _J Vo + _T V-
1
+ a o bp _ °
b V a o
+a
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leads to i/b V
(i+ b_p1) oa =_-
Expanding by the binomial theorem gives
Now V_ V
O,
lb V P1 V V -V0 0 0
i +_ _-P1 + "'" =V- or _- ,,V- - 1 ,,--V--
so we replace V by V in the denominator, and obtain
0
P V -V
a
V
O
Previously we wrote that
2
u _ (Pi-Po) (Vo-Vl)
then by substitution from Eq. 6 we obtain for this case
(Eq. 3)
2 PlVo
u = (PI - Po ) a
2 PlVo P_V o
u = (Pl - Po) --_'--
a a
Differentiating Eq. 6 gives the result
i dP= dV dP a
a v a-V= -V
O O
2 dP
Now c = _-_ where c = speed of sound in concrete = 13,000 ft/sec
7
2
C
/0 1 _!_ dV
= q _ = V 2
2 2
= _ V2 dP _P c c
Then by substitution, 2
a c
V = 2
o V
o
and by substitution in Eq. 7a gives
2
V c
O =
a
(6)
(7)
(7a)
!
O
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2 Pl2C 2 c
u = u= PI_
2
a
c
u = PI
a = 435,000 for P in bars, for concrete
c = 15,000 ft/sec
(8)
psi = 2040 bars,
The shock wave in the concrete raises the pressure to 50,000
2040. 132000 20.4 • 13
u = = 61 ft/sec
4.55- lO 5 - &.35
When the shock wave reaches the air interface at the bottom
of the plug it reflects in the concrete as an expansion wave, and this wave doublGs
the material velocity. Thus, the three-foot thick plug should clear in about
30 milliseconds. This is much too late to afford substantial pressure relief
to the top and sides of the tank.
C. Damage to Floor Adjacent to Tank
On the basis of the solid angle intercepted by the area
adjacent to the tank, it readily follows that this region receives 7.5 per cent
of the 1.8. 108 calories generated by the explosion. This is 1.55 - 107 calories.
However, this energy is not completely delivered to the concrete because much
of it is degraded in the water to irreversible thermal energy by the shock wave.
Calculation of this loss has shown that under the conditions in
the tank, only 6.6 per cent of the initial 1.35 o 107 calories is available for
hydrodynamic work. The transfer of energy from water to concrete is a rather
inefficient process due to the different characteristics of the material and
therefore only 40 per cent of the useful energy in the water is given up to the
concrete. The result of these losses, due to irreversibility and poor energy
transfer, is that only 3.18 ° 105 calories are available to crush concrete.
If we consider the shock wave as a piston, the rate of work
per unit area in a shock is given by
8O
dW
-- = PU
dt
The energy required to crush concrete is then given by:
W =/P u dt
dR
dt can be written as dt = -- then
U
S
W Uu7
where, using conservative and convenient approx:mations,
P = pressure required to crush concrete_ 5500 psi
u = flow velocity behind the shock wave _ 14 ft/sec
U = shock wave velocity in con.;rete_ 15,OOO ft/sec
s
dlR = linear distance parameter in feet
With these values,
(9)
(io)
i ft
W = # 3500 lb-sec 14L in. 2 14 ft dR
Jo 13,000 ft it. 2 ft 2 sec
W = 542 lb-ft _32 ft = 17,500 lb-ft2
--_ for one cubic foot of
sec sec
concrete.
ib_ft 2
One calorie = lO0 ----
2
sec
cubic foot of concrete.
, so that 175 calories are required to crush one
See author's note page 90.
The bottom section contains i0_9 ft 5 of concrete according to
the last set of plans submitted to Armour Resealch Foundation. To crush this
amount of concrete, 1029 " 173 = 178,000 calories are required. Previously, it
was determined that 3.18 • l05 calories were available for crushing the bottom,
therefore, it appears that the bottom would be destroyed. This was mentioned
to Mr. Turk at an ARF-NACA meeting, and the concrete was later substantially
increased in thickness to approximately 17 feet. The bottom of the reactor was
then adjudged safe with a factor of about four.
The question was also raised as to the effect crushed sand
particles from the plug might have on striking the floor of the control room,
possibly
!
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cracking it. If the sand strikes the floor at 120 ft/sec, the velocity of
the concrete after the blow is given by the formula:
u1
u2= / c2 (ll)
l+/_c 1
where uI is the crushed material velocity, 120 ft/sec; cI is the velocity of
sound in loose sand, Cl =_/200@ ft/sec; the density of loose sand 60 Ib___
ft3 =/_"
The factors u2, c2,_2 represent the same parameters for concrete.
120
u2 - 14. 13 = 7.4 ft/sec
1 + 6 . 2
By our previous formula applied to the wave in concrete
Pc
u2 = -- a = 435,000 for P in barsa
yields, P--_3600 psi.
This pressure is barely enough to crush concrete and would not conceivably
crush the floor of the control room.
Other than the 9-foot thick quadrant, the sides of the reactor
were expected to fail immediately. The shock pressures were computed on the
water retaining wall some 30 feet away after ignoring these walls. This will
somewhat overestimate the forces on these walls and is therefore conservative.
A calculation of the pressures fro_ Cole's equation gives 4300 psi
on the 70-foot water retaining wall. If we assume that this wall fails
immediately, then the water velocity behind the shock wave would be 60 ft/sec.
When the wall breaks, an expansion wave passes into the water and increases
its velocity to 120 ft/sec. The expansion wave then reflects from the remains
of the reactor tank and returns to catch up with the water-concrete interface
moving at 120 ft/sec. The distance this interface travels before the reflected
wave catches up and causes cavitation is obtained from
a d+ 55
12--_" -TO00
4000 d = 120 d + 55" 120 3880d = 55" 120 (12)
d = 55- 120
3880 = 1.7 feot
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Thus no solid wave of water reaches the outer wall of the canal and the only
pressures will be due to "water seiche" effects urtil the water settles to a
depth of about 9 feet in the canal. Therefore, t_e far wall of the canal
should be safe as designed.
The question of sand from this wall hitting the lO0-foot wall that
is 15.5 feet further can be analyzed the same way. Here P = 4300 psi = 292
bars, so the sand velocity is
292" 13tO00 = 8.75 ft/sec (Eq. 8)
u = -- 435,000
When reduced by the previous formula to peak pressure, this analysis shows
that no damage from sand need be anticipated. Th_ latter wall is then safe
if designed for the static pressures alone.
For the quadrant where the concrete is 9 feet thick, there is about
1230 ft 3 of concrete which would require 1230- 17_ = 213,000 calories to crush
it. From a calculation of the energy available ir this reactor, we see that
350,000 calories could be transmitted to the concrete, so the 9-foot sector is
probably crushed, but barely so.
If we then calculate the pressures on the water retaining wall for
an explosion of 550,000 - 213,000 = 157,000 calories or 137 grams of TNT
(157 grams at 455 g/ib = 0.51 pounas of TNT),
P _ 2.16- 104 I_ 1/3)
13
/
P - 2.16. l0 b (0.0135) = 290 psi
Reflected pressure = 600 psi
Thus the pressure on the water retaining wall _s 600 psi but the available
energy is only 1400 calories. Therefore, the dur_.tion of the pressure is so
short that the wall may be considered to hold. _Lis may be easily shown as
follows: Only 1400 calories are available in the water. A calculation of the
energy required to compress one cubic inch of wat_r to 600 psi shows it to be
0.017 calories. Therefore, only 82,500 in. 5 or 4"'.7 ft 3 of water can be
compressed. For a wall area of 8120 ft 2 in this sector, the layer is 0.006
foot thick, and can maintain such a pressure for _,nly a few microseconds. A
pressure of such short duration will not damage the wall.
I
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D. Final Pressure in the Bnclosure under the Dome
Using the equation
PV
E =_( -i
with V, the volume under the dome = 292,000 ft 3
Z, the total energy release = 1.8" 108 calories
(one calorie = i00 ib ft2)
2
sec
and choosing_= 1.4, we obtain
(13)
p. 1.8. lO l° lb ft2 sec2 (0.4)
2.9. 105 sec 2 32 ft
P = 705 ib/ft 2 = 4.9 psi
Since the dome will be designed for static pressures of this order with an
adequate safety factor, it appears that the dome will remain intact.
The possibility of pieces of concrete being driven through the
dome may be eliminated by considering the behavior of the sides of the tank
after the explosion. The speed of sound in concrete is much higher than
the speed of the shock wave in water so a precursor will travel through the
c_crete and will begin to force the concrete sides of the tank inward at
the top of the tank. Since these l_leces will be under the leas top of the
tank s they cannot be driven far by the water shock wave when it comes. This
precrushing of the concrete top of the tank will allow further escape of the
high pressure water from the top of the tank.
E. The Top of the Tank
The top of the tank consists of several plates with a total mass
of 107,800 pounds. With allowances for waste heat in water, the top of the
receives ii.4-i04 calories. If all this energy is given to the plates,
the plates can rise to a height given by
]l II.4 ib ftR sec 2,1 _
"---- " = 3.3 feet (14)
h _ 1.078 sec 2 ib 32 ft
8o this set of plates can rise only 3.3 feet above the top of the reactor
structure.
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Mr. Turk of N_CA made a more conservative analysis in which the
pressure-time distribution for a fixed plate was used but the plates were
considered unrestrained. The result of this analysis was that the plate
rose to a height of 15 feet. So even on this basis, the top of the reactor
is safe.
F. The Spray Dome
When the shock wave from the explodin_ reactor intersects the
water surface, it reflects as an expansion wave End raises the water in a
base surge. This spray dome will travel at aboul 120 ft/sec into the air
and will strike the sides and the top of the dome. The force on the dome
due to this spray is given by
1 = 1 64" (120) 2 ft 2 sec ft 2 = i00 l_____bb (15)
g 2 3? ° i_4 ft 5 sec 2 ft in. 2 in. 2
This pressure will exist locally and for very short times. Since this is far
below the yield strength of steel, no damage nee( by expected from the spray
dome.
G. Anal[sls of the Desisn Safet 7 Factors
I. The plu_ and bottom of the reactor"
The incident pressure on the plug is
P1 - 20.5" 104 = 1.5" 104 = 15,0()0 psi = 1025 bars
(lO) 1.13
The shock wave velocity is 5180 ft/sec in the wa_er; therefore by the time
this wave strikes the plug it is essentially a plane wave and the plug fails
as a unit. The water velocity behind the shock _ve is 205.0 ft/sec. When
the shock wave hits the plug it starts to move a_ a velocity of
c 1025 13
_= P _ = _ = 30.7 ft/se,:
if the plug yields right away. If the plug does not, then its velocity
would go up to 60 ft/sec since the transmitted pl-essure would be higher
by at most a factor of two. When the shock wave reaches the bottom of the
plug it reflects as an expansion wave and double_ the material velocity.
Thus we get a picture of the broken plug followe,[ closely by the water, moving
O
O4
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down into the control room llke a piston. We have shown previously that the
damage from loose flying sand is negligible, but the moving water has a large
amount of kinetic energy which could damage the control room floor if no
energy extraction from the water took place.
If the door to the control room is of heavy construction and
fails comparatively slowly, the trapped air in the room will absorb a large
amount of energy from the moving water as it comes down. It is suggested
that compression takes place so rapidly that the door does not fall until
the walls of the control room do (at some 5500 psi).
The work required to compress an ideal gas isentropically, per
unit mass is given by
For an ideal gas
then
can be written as
w =/PdV (16)
C
V=
(p) I/_"
i
i ,_ - i
dV = -_(P) C
2
(P)_"
dP
1
c (P)
Pi
C _ ,
9-- l (p)
1 (1v)
(18)
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W
but since
V s
We can write it as
So that the work done is
(P)
C
1
PI VI - P2 V2
-1
=W
C
--_=_= 1.4 for air
C
V
P2
If the final pressure P2 = 3500 psi and Pl = 14 7 psi, _i = 238.
i
isentropic compression _2 . pl_ f
i ft3 t3
Vl = 0.072 lb = 13.9 1-'b-
V1
W = (13.9) (14.7) (144) - (0.276) (3500) (144)
0.4
= 269,0¢C ft (32 ft) = 86. l05 ft2
2 --_
see sec
V2 = 0.276 ft-_5lb
lb-in.2ft 3
in.2_ft21b
per i_ of air
(19)
(20)
(21)
Since for an
The control room contains 64.2 pounds of air so the energy
required to compress this air is
5400. 105 Ib-ft2
2 = 54. lO 5 :alories
gec
The fraction of the energy which is sent toward the plug by
the shock wave is
!
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20.2
--= 0.202 = 20.2 per cent of the initial amount.lO0
Since spreading of the plug will give most of the energy to the walls, we can
calculate the percentage of energy delivered to the floor of the control room.
20.2
_;t27_2 = 0.0277 = 2.77 per cent
Since 400 pounds of TNT will give up 1.8- 108 calories, we see that 1.8" i0 O" x
(2.77) = 4.98" 106 calories are sent toward the plug. All but 6.5 per cent
of this is lost due to irreversible heating, leaving 4.98- 104 (6.5) = 32.4. 104
calories. But this is about I0 times less than the energy required to compress
the air in the control room to the point where the walls might fail. On this
basis, the fragments do not damage the floor and we have a safety factor of
about i0 for crushing of the control room walls. After the door ruptures, a
shock wave will propagate through the passageway from the control room and
exhaust into the room outside the gas-tight enclosure.
The strength of this shock wave may be roughly computed from
standard shock tube theory if the door is presumed to burst like a diaphragm.
(Note that any fragments from the door will be stopped by the stairways.)
The incident pressure behind this shock wave will be about
308 psi initially and the reflected pressure will be about 2000 psi. Due to
shock wave attenuation, the actual pressures on the door that closes off the
stairway to the control room passage, from the room outside to the lO0-foot
shell, will be about 290 psi. The duration of this pressure will be about
3 milliseconds. If the door is designed to sustain this pressure, no further
damage from the shock wave need be expected.
The 70-foot wall was shown to be safe for the explosion of h00
pounds of TNT, since its failure would not injure the lO0-foot wall, or the
gas-tight shell. Just what factor of safety this provides is difficult to say
since the expansion waves which cavitate the residual fragments of the 70-foot
wall, will perform the same function for much larger quantities of explosive.
H. The Cap of the Reactor Tank
The calculation by Mr. Turk of NACA showed that on the most
conservative assumptions, the cap would rise only 15 feet above its position
on the reactor. If we assume the effects of the explosion to scale according
to the standard _/3 scaling, the cap would rise only 19 feet for 800 pounds
of TNT. Since the distance from the cap to the top of the dome is 48 feet,
it would seem that there is an adequate factor of safety for even lO00 pounds
of TNT.
Recently a decision was made to const_ct the 70-foot wall so
that it would hold under the blast from 400 pounds of TNT. The incident
pressure would be about 4300 psi and the reflected pressure about 9450 psi
(643 bars). In the worst case this pressure woul_ have the longest duration at
the bottom of the tank, about 6.65 milliseconds, while at the top of the tank
the pressures would be relieved immediately. A f Lrst estimate of the pressure-
time curve is given below.
I
O
L_
643
P(bars)
1
Bottom of Tank
Near
ii _pof Tank
ii
1 2 3 4 15 16 7
Time, millisecon@_
A more realistic assumption can be obt_ined from s consideration
of the energy available at the 70-foot wall. For a wall 25 feet high,
30 feet from the explosion, and extending around _ree-fourths of the tank
perimeter, we have
3 (2_) 30(25) = 3670 ft:!
A sphere 30 feet in diameter would have a surface area
4_(30) 2 = 11,300 ft 2
Thus the wall receives 31,8 per cent of the original energy of the explosion,
less waste heat losses, At a pressure of 643 bars only 5,5 per cent of the
available energy remains once waste heat losses are calcttlated.
89
_9
O
!
C_
!
O
O
Thus of the original 1.8 " 108 calories only 3.69 • lO6 calories
remain after the losses due to waste heat and the factor due to the geometry,
have been subtracted. Dividing this net energy available by the wall area in
this reactor we obtain 327 calories/ft 2. To compress one cubic foot of water
to 9250 psi requires 7000 calories. Since only 327 calories/ft 2 are available
a layer only O.046-foot thick can be compressed. This thin layer of water could
sustain the pressure for less than a few milliseconds. It seems therefore that
the impulse delivered to this wall will be almost negligible, even at the bottom
of the wall.
A final estimate of impulse function was made using a pressure-
time law of the form of a square wave
P = P P = 9250 l___bb
c c in_
This formula was used for the pressure-time curve with a cut-off sharply at
5 milliseconds, because at that time the relieving expansion wave would have
traveled back through the wall to the water-concrete interface. The analysis
of the wall on this basis is given at the end of this report.
I. Calculation of Enersy Required to Compress Water
Then from our earlier work,
V2
PdV (Eq. 16)
2
2 VdP c o
d-V= - -- dV =
V2 2C
O
dP
W U --
P2
v2pdp = °-2__2c2 (21)
9O
For one case PI = 14.7 psi P2 = 600 psi
V = 0.016 ft--_5
O
_56,1o-6 ft6-sec2_
W =_2(20.2.106)lbs2-ft 7
W - 46 ft2
2 per pound;
sec
45o0 !c - ft/seclbs
O0 lb9 1_44 __. 0 ft2
in.2 . f_ sec
Therefore,
W = 62.4(46) ibs ft---_2= 2870 ibs-ft2
2 2
sec sec
that is,
then one cubic foot weighs 62.4 pounds
for cne cubic foot
287____O0=1.66 ibs-ft2
1730 2
sec
= 0.0166 cal/in. 3
For the other case where the pressure goes to 9_00 psi,
_ 2
W = (256. 10 -6 ) ft6-sec 2 1020 ft2 I( I
t-
2(20.2 • 106) see 4 9-5) (1.44)
L J
ft2
= 11,200 2; so for one cubic foot, it is
sec
(1.12, 104 ) (62.4) = 70. 104
Author's Note
ibs_ft 2
2
sec
lO lO
= 7000 calories per ft3
In evaluating Eq. 8 for a particular case it was assumed that
the shock wave could raise the pressure in the concrete to 30,000 psi. In
evaluating Eq. lO, however, it was assumed that the material was crushed at
3500 psi. The obvious contradiction of these two assumptions requires some
explanation.
To the best of the author's knowledge no data exists for the
equation of state for concrete under shock loadiag. However it is known that
the yield properties of concrete are a function Df the rate of application of
stress/ see Watstein (3).
(3)Watsteln D. Properties of Concrete at High R_tes of Loading; ASTM Preprint
I
o
#936, 1955
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Under these circumstances a decision was made to be as conservative
as possible without prejudice to the overall reactor design° Therefore in
Eq. 8 when the crushed material velocity is determined as a function of shock
overpressure, the highest pressure is used. While in Eq. lO the standard
cylinder strength of 3500 psi is used to determine the energy required to crush
concrete.
The Foundation has proposed to the AEC a general reactor safety
program with particular emphasis on safe design practices and equation of state
for parameters for materials like concrete. Since no data of this sort will
be available until too late to influence the NACA reactor, it is thought that
the above assumptions are necessary to assure an adequate factor of safety
regardless of the final equation of state data obtained as a result of the
general study mentioned above.
.
J. Motion of Containment Wall Due to Shock Loadin$
Nomenclature
U i
r =
PO =
h -
h I "
t =
O
t =
strain in the tangential direction, in./in.
displacement, in.
inside radius of wall, in.
density of wall, lb/in. 5
yield stress of steel, psi
characteristic pressure, psi
thickness of wall, in.
equivalent thickness of steel reinforcement, in.
duration of loading, sec
time of maximum deflection, sec
The analysis of the containment wall due to shock loading will
be carried on by considering a thin-walled cylinder of circular cross section
loaded uniformly with a load per unit area of p = pof(t), Fig. 4. Due to
symmetry the displacements will be radial and the strains will be given by
u (22)7
u, positive outward I is the radial displacement.
by E. Saleme
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The inertia force of an element of mass -z"
g
r h d 0 will be
_z
r h u d 0 (23)
g
Neglecting the elastic portion of the deformation, the restraining force
will be O-yh I which gives a component in the radial direction.
0-y h I d @ (24)
The forcing function can be written as
Po r d e f (t)
The equation of motion is then_
(25)
or
Then
g
rhud@+
_y hld@ = Por d e f (t) (26)
"_ = K Po (t)-
-_ Po r|
_= (_ x 36 - 6 x 1.2}2) x o.o868 + 6xl.2_xo,28__ = o.o996 _b/in3
x 36
Po = 600 _ i_ = 9000 Zh/in_
h = 36 in,
r = 35 x 12 : 420 in.
_y = 30,O00 ib/in_
6 x 1.2_ 2 = 2.344 in.
hi - h
Po 8_
_' h
__zhl = _
Po r 9000
0 : 0.994 x i06 in./sec 2
0.0186
f(t) = l
f(t) : 0
F'(t) = t
F'(t) = t
t 2°
F(t) = -_
o_<t k-t
O
t ._ t
O
Ogt<t
O
to_t
0_<t_t
O
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t
o (2t- to) t _<tF(t). -_ o
* o.994, lO6 f(t) - o.o186
6
F' (t) 0.0196t
= 0.994, i0
t#
u =0.994. lO 6 F (t) - o.o185 2
t
* o
t " 0.0--.//////_
t
o
Umx = O.994" lO 6 _
t 2 2
o.981_ o . 26.223 (t • LO3)
_ --g- o
(2t* - t ) - 0.0186 t*2
o -2- = 0.994. lO 6
t m 0.0005 see
o
U m 6.56 in.
mx
U
_mx mx 6.56
= T= -i_= 0.0156
which is acceptable for steel.
_00
6oo- I
I
c
400..
._ 200.
PRESSURE TIME CURW: ON 70-FOOTWALL
The foregoing analysis shows that under the condition of the
problem, the strain in the steel bars will rea_:h a value of 1.56 per cent
or some fifteen times the st_in corresponding to the yield point of the
material. This means that the damage to the _tll due to the blast will
reduce to some permanent deformation of the re:nforcing bars and a partial
cracking of the concrete.
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K. Motion of the Outer Reactor Shell Due to Internal Explosion
The outer reactor shell has the shape of an ellipsoid of
revolution, see Fig. 3.
B
A
i
I
lO0 ft
Fig. 5 MERIDIAN SECTION OF SHELL
The meridian ellipse is defined by
2 £
x___ + Z__ = 1 (27)
5o2 252
In what follows, an approximate analysis of the shell under a dynamic loading
acting over a portion of its surface is carried out by means of the following
simplifying assumptions.
(1) The ellipsoidal shell is substituted by a spherical
shell whose meridian passes through the Points A and B (40,15) with radius
2 (b - y)2 402 + (25 - 15) 2 85 feet (28)X +
r = 2 (b - y) = '2(25 - 15) =
(2) The displacements of the points of the shell are
given by radial displacement
meridional displacement
where w
0
v-O
is the displacement of Point A.
radius r_
(3o)
(5) The shell deforms plastically above the parallel of
- r sinO(for which the meridional stress is equal to _-.
Y
By E. Saleme
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The loading consists of a uniformly distributed pressure, p = pof(t),
as a function of time, Fig. h, applied on the surface bound by the parallel of
sin 4o. Then, the resultant ext,_rnal force will beradius r O r
F(t) =_rr 2 2o Po f (t) = 7Tp ° r sin 9 /o f(t) (31)
where Po is the peak pressure.
The total inertia force is, by Assumption 2,
2 " sin dI- 2_Z h r w os 2 / 2 2 ..- 7/ hr _ (Z- oos3_) (32)
g o _ g o
The resisting force is by Assumpti_,n 3)
R = 2_h r _y sin2_ (33)
The equation of motion is then
_7_2 _'g h r2(l - cos3o%) Wo + 2qT"h r G'y sin2c7% =q7JPo r2 sin2 /o f(t)
or
•.o h
Upon integrating
sin2/o (t) - 2 C_y h _ (35)
1 - cosS_ ]'o r sin
sin /o f(?')d 2" - 2 .---[Y g s_n2 _
1 - cos3_ Po r sin2/o
The time of maximum is given by
t
f (_1 di_ ,-
2_- *
y h sin 2 6_ t
= ¢ (37)
Po r sin2/o
Figure 5 shows the graphical solution of Eq. 37 for various values of_ •
The maximum displacement is F- t
w°mx' h l-coJ /
In Eq. 12 let
* (_8)
_ - Po sin2/o
!
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3 g Po
A = _ _ --_ (39)
B = 2 Cr-y h
Then
Po r
*
*__ot _ =_
A 1 f(_) d dt F(t) dt
. t.2
A 2 = B
W mE _ A , 0 * * *
o 1 - cos3oh 1 - A = _ A1 - cos 3 ck
By Assumption 2 we have
w(_) = w
o
coso_
By Assumption 3, the meridional strain at_ =_must be equal to the yield
strain, that is,
w(_[ . 1 -V
r E
From Eqs. hO, 41 and 22 it follows
Data
sln2 _o
l-l/ _-y =A
E
1 - cos 3dX
A cos o_
g I 586 in./sec 2
ry" = 0°283 lb/in. 5
h = 0.5 in.
Po = 650 psi
= 30,000 psi
r = 85 ft _ 1020 in.
sin_ ° = lO = 0.11756; /o = 6" 45.38'
(4o)
(&l)
(h2)
(43)
then
100
3 g Po 3 386 650
- 2.66 • 106 in,,/sec 22 7' h - 2 O.-TTg3 0.5
s= 2 o-y h = 2 3__ 0.5 - 0.04525
Po r 650 1020
(i -Y) o--
0.7 - _%000
w (o<) = E r = 30 • i0 • !.020 = 0.714 in.
The values of w (_) for values of _ ranging fJom ii ° to 18 ° are tabulated
on Table I. Figure 6 dhows that, for _ = 17°. 6 w (c_) has the value of
0.714 inches and w is equal to 0 749 inches
o max " "
Therefore the maximum displacemen_ of Point A _s 0.749 inches which is well
within safe design limits.
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III. REACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS WITH THE BULK SHIELDING REACTOR:
WORTH OF VOIDS WITHIN CORE} WORTH OF FUEL ELEMENT
WATER PASSAGES AND FUEL ELEMENT PLATES
By Donald Bogart and Theodore M. Hallman
November 15, 1956
SUMMARY
Reactivity effects of voids, water passages, and fuel plates in a
fuel element at the center of a 7 element by 5 element core loading have
been measured at the Bulk Shielding Reactor. This loading was intended
to simulate the first core loading of the NACA Research Reactor. It was
found that displacement of water from unfueled regions at the center of
the core by air introduced positive reactivity. The worth of voided fuel
element water passages extending the full height of the core was negative_
however. Removal of fuel plates also introduced negative reactivity.
These results indicate that for some reactor designs_ displacement
of water by air or steam in regions of high statistical importance can
introduce significant positive reactivities. Although continued displace-
ment of water will finally introduce strong negative reactivitiesj a nega-
tive void coefficient may not always exist.
In regard to the NACA Research Reactor it is concluded that negative
reactivity changes are introduced on accidental flooding by water of gas-
cooled unfueled experiments at the center of the reactor core.
INTRODUCTION
An important space for experiments in the NACA Research Reactor is
the volume made available by removing the shim-rod fuel element at the
center of the 9 element by 5 element active lattice comprising the pro-
posed initial loading. Experimental assemblies designed for suitable
containment in this 3-inch square by 24-inch long high flux space may
contain gas or liquid cooled fueled or unfueled test specimens.
The reactivity effects for fueled and unfueled experiments in this
vertical center test hole as calculated by group diffusion theory are
been presented in the Hazards Summary report (ref. i). To augment these
reactivity calculations and to permit estimation of reactivity effects of
compositional changes to the center test space, an experimental program
with the Bulk Shielding Reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was
jointly planned and executed by BSR and NACA personnel. In these experi-
ments the NACA core loading was mocked up within the limits of excess
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reactivity and materials available to BSR. A 7 element by 3 element
loading of 140 gram fuel elements was assemblc_dwhich was reflected by
rows of canned0eryllium oxide followed by wa_er and which provided 2.5
percent excess reactivity. This loading permitted the measurementof
reactivity effects of voids within the core a_d the worth of fuel ele-
ment water passages and fuel element plates. The Bulk Shielding Reactor
is fully discussed in reference 2. Reactivity measurementswith this
reactor have been reported in references 33 4_ and 5.
It is a pleasure to acknowledgethe cooperation of the staff of the
Bulk Shielding Reactor_ in particular the efforts of F. C. Maienschein3
K. M. Henry_ and E. B. Johnson whowere resporsible for completing the
lengthy experimental program in the brief period allotted.
!
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REACTOR
The BSR is an assembly of MTR-type fuel elements which may be ar-
ranged into various critical configurations, the fuel is fully enriched
uranium contained in aluminum-clad fuel plates. A complete fuel element
is made up of eighteen fuel plates and contain_ a total of about 140
grams of uranium-235.
The reactor is controlled by two guillotiue-type safety "rods_" one
conventional safety rod_ and one regulating rol. The elements through
which the conventional safety rod and the regulating rod move contain
half the normal number of fuel plates and_ therefore, about 70 grams of
uranium-235 each. The primary reflector elements are hot-pressed beryl-
lium oxide blocks encased in water tight aluminum cans of the same outer
dimensions as the fuel elements. The reactor [s moderated and cooled by
water which also serves as the secondary refle:tor and reactor shield.
The reactor configuration used in the pre_ent reactivity experiments
is schematically shown in figure i. This loadlng_ designated loading 53
at BSR_ consisted of 21 fuel elements in a 7 b_ 3 array with one row of
Be0 reflector pieces on the north and two rows of Be0 reflector pieces on
the south. The east and west faces of the cor_ were reflected by water
and permitted complete insertion or complete w:thdrawal of the two guillo-
tine safeties shown. Each guillotine safety w_s made of a thin cadmium
sheet between two aluminum plates approximatel, 12 inches wide and 24
inches high. The guillotine safeties were guiced and positioned relative
to the core by vertical grooved aluminum piece_ and supported by the elec-
tromagnets actuated by the scram circuits. A regulating rod and a core
safety rod were provided in the control-rod fu_l elements in grid posi-
tions 23 and 27 respectively.
Experimental fuel assemblies occupied the number 25 grid position
and were of three kinds:
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i. A standard control-rod fuel element into which aluminum chambers
of various sizes and contents were inserted in the control-rod space.
This element with a typical aluminum chamber partially inserted is shown
in figure 2.
2. A standard fuel element specially modified by manifolds at both
top and bottom so that the seventeen individual water passages between
fuel plates could be selectively voided in any combination. The water
passages were voided by blowing air through any of 34 plastic air tubes.
3. A standard fuel element in which twelve of the eighteen convex
fuel plates were not brazed into the grooved straight end plates. A
photograph of this removable fuel plate assembly is shown in figure 3.
With the exception of the end fuel plates and four fuel plates blocked
by the fuel element handle_ the remaining fuel plates are removable.
REGULATING-ROD CALIBRATIONS
From safeguards considerations_ core loadings at BSR are specifically
prohibited from containing excess reactivities greater than 2.5 percent.
It is desirable to have as much excess reactivity as possible in order to
cover a wide range of compositional changes in the experimental fuel as-
semblies_ it will be shown that the core loading selected (see fig. i)
had the legal maximum 2_K/K of 2.5 percent.
The regulating rod calibration was obtained by the method of distri-
buted poisons (ref. 2) for three configurations of the guillotine safe-
ties: both guillotines out_ no. I guillotine out - no. 2 guillotine in_
and both guillotines in. As the regulating rod in the 23 grid position
was inserted_ the safety rod in the 27 grid position was withdrawn to
maintain criticality for each guillotine configuration. This procedure
was repeated for the clean core and for the core as uniformly poisoned as
possible by 224 quarter - gram pieces of gold foil. Seven gold foils were
taped to each of 32 thin strips of Lucite 26-inches long. The foils were
equally spaced on the strips and located in fuel-element water passages
so as to poison the core vertically and laterally as uniformly as possi-
ble. In all $6.25 grams of gold were used with a cross section of 0.299
cm2/gm for a total poison cross section of 16.82 cm 2. The reactor core
was estimated to have a total cross section of 6281 cm 2. During these
calibrations_ a standard fuel element assembly occupied the 25 grid
position.
The addition of the gold thermal absorber has a negligible effect on
the epithermal and thermal neutron diffusion properties of the core and
the Lucite foil holders are sufficiently similar in composition to water
to introduce no additional heterogeneity. Therefore_ from elementary re-
actor theory_ the change in reactivity is given by the fractional change
in total absorption cross section for the core resulting from the addi-
tion of the gold foils or
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The number I safety rod position as a function of the regulating
rod position for the core configuration with both guillotine safeties
out is shown in figure 4. Two curves are sho_n for the core without gold
foils and for the core with gold foils. The horizontal difference be-
tween these curves is the regulating rod traw_l corresponding to the
Z_K/K of the gold foils. This change in reac;ivity due to the gold foils
and the smoothed curves of the regulating rod position as a function of
the number I safety rod position necessary to maintain criticality permit
the graphical construction of the integral regulating rod calibration
curves shown in figure 5. Three curves_ each for a configuration of the
guillotine safeties_ are presented which have been normalized to a point
at the approximate center of the regulating rc_d travel. These curves are
constructed from the faired data and no extr_)olations are employed. It
may be seen that the curves for the configure;ions in which both .guillo-
tines were out and the no. i guillotine out aild no. 2 guillotine in prac-
tically superimpose for most of the regulatini_ rod travel. However 3 the
curve for the configuration in which both guillotines were in indicates
a reduction in rod effectiveness resulting frc_m the depression of neutron
flux around the regulating rod due to the proximity of the no. i guillo-
tine. The regulating rod at 25 grid position is sufficiently removed
from the no. i safety rod in the 27 grid position to minimize interaction
of these rods in the calibration procedure. ]it is noted that the cali-
bration curves are not symmetrical about the center of regulating rod
travel. Furthermore_ the effectiveness of th_ regulating rod given by
the slope of the curve is not zero when fully inserted or fully withdrawn
relative to the active portion of the core.
An alternative method for calibrating th_ regulating rod is to place
the reactor on various asymptotic periods by _ithdrawal of the regulating
rod various amounts. The inhour relation may then be used to translate
the asymptotic period into reactivity corresponding to the total regulat-
ing rod movement. This method cannot be used with the present core be-
cause of the photoneutron source arising from the Be4(y_n) He 4 reaction
in the Be0 primary reflector which acts to augment the delayed neutron
fraction and perturb the usual inhour relatior.
To obtain an indication of the magnitude of the photoneutron contri-
butions to reactivity in the present core loading_ the reactor was placed
on various asymptotic periods by sudden withdlawal of the regulating rod.
The reactivity inserted was obtained from the integral regulating rod
calibration curves presented in figure 5. Thc asymptotic periods were
obtained from a logarithmic count rate recorder and from a period indi-
cator. These data_ which were obtained for t_e reactor with all three
configurations of the guillotine safeties 3 are presented in figure 6. In-
cluded on figure 6 is the variation of reactivity with asymptotic period
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for an equivalent unreflected reactor as calculated by the inhour equa-
tion considering five delayed neutron groups (this curve was taken from
ref. 3). Differences in neutron lifetime for the various reactor ioad-
ings at BSR have a negligible effect on the long periods presented in
figure 6.
It may be seen that all of the data lie above the usual inhour val-
ues indicating the presence of extraneous neutron sources which may be
attributed to the interaction of fission product gammas with the beryl-
lium in the primary reflector.
REACTIVITY EFFECTS OF VOIDS
A standard control-rod fuel element was placed in the number 25 grid
position into which aluminum chambers of various sizes and contents were
inserted in the water filled control-rod space as shown in figure 2. The
construction of these hollow 2S aluminum chambers is shown in figure 7.
A reinforcing web and relatively thick end plates were required to prevent
distortion of the 0.064-inch thick walls under the external pressure of
20 feet of water in the reactor pool. Chambers of inside height of A_ 12_
20_ and 24 inches were used_ a photograph of several of these assembled
with the bolted cover and aluminum positioning rod are shown in figure 8.
These chambers were positioned in the aperture of the control-rod
fuel element in the empty condition and when full of water and the indi-
vidual reactivity effects measured. The difference in Z_K should esti-
mate the reactivity effects of the air spaces or void volumes in the cham-
ber at various vertical positions in the reactor core. A 24-inch chamber
was also filled with graphite powder in one case and with a silica aero-
gel compound in another case to ascertain the reactivity effects of low-
density scattering media in the aluminum chambers.
An additional experiment was performed to determine the reactivity
effects of water displacement by material above and below the chamber in
the control-rod aperture. Special 2S aluminum plate pieces_ which were
of the same aluminum-water ratio as the core 3 were added to the top and
bottom of two chambers. These assembled chambers are shown in the photo-
graph in figure 95 the inset shows the cross section of one of the top
pieces.
The reactivity effects of the 4-inch and 12-inch aluminum chambers
for various vertical locations in the 25 grid position are shown in fig-
ures i0 and ii respectively. The chamber locations relative to the core
horizontal midplane are schematically illustrated. The observed reactiv-
ities are plotted at the geometric center of the chambers for both the
air-filled and water-filled cases. The difference between these cases is
then an estimate of the reactivity effect of the air or void volume only_
and these are plotted as the dashed lines.
ii0
The data indicate that displacement of water in the aperture of the
control-rod fuel element either by the aluminum of the water-filled cham-
bers or by the total volume of the air-filled chambers introduces positive
reactivity. The positive reactivity due to introduction of voids is
greatest at the geometric center of the core_ reactivity falls off and
changes sign at the top and the bottom regions of the core.
A qualitative explanation of these data must lie in the relative
spatial importance of absorptivity and moderating ability of the various
materials. Inasmuch as the macroscopic absorption cross section for
thermal neutrons is 0.0133 cm -I for aluminum and 0.0220 cm -I for water 3
a positive reactivity due to displacement of water by aluminum should be
expected. Similarly_ the displacement of water by air should result in
positive reactivity. These absorptivity eff,_cts seem to dominate in cen-
tral core regions of high statistical importance. However_ at the top
and bottom regions of the core_ where absorb,_r importance becomes rela-
tively small 3 it appears that displacement o:" water is more an effect of
loss of moderator than loss of absorber. Th_ net result in core regions
of low statistical importance is a negative reactivity due to displace-
ment of water by either aluminum or void.
Results for the 4-inch and 12-inch chaml,ers with the aluminum-plate
end pieces (shown in fig. 9) are also prese_ed in figures i0 and Ii as
the flagged points near the core midplane. ['he aluminum end-plate assem-
bly weights are tabulated below:
Chamber
4-1nch
12-1nch
Weight_ m
Top plates
503.4
305.5
Bot om plates
593. i
4:22.6
The data of figures i0 and ii indicate _hat the increased displace-
ment of water by the aluminum-plate end pieces for the water-filled cham-
bers resulted in smaller net positive reacti_ities. This is probably due
to negative reactivity contributions resultirg from water displacement at
the top and bottom of the core. On the other hand; the increased displace-
ment of water by the aluminum-plate end pieces for the air-filled chambers
resulted in a greater +AK/K for the 4-inch chamber and a smaller +AK/K
for the 12-inch chamber. The net void effects in both cases were slight-
ly more positive.
Because the reactivity is changing so rapidly at the top and the bot-
tom of the core 3 the curve of void effect due to the 4-inch chamber in
figure l0 cannot be considered a measure of the differential void effect.
A finer vertical traverse with the 4-inch chamber would have permitted
graphing the differential void effect; unfortunately this was not done.
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For the central regions of the core_ however 3 the void effect curve of
figure i0 does approximate a differential curve. Integration of the re-
sults for the 4-inch chamber gives very closely the reactivity effects
of the 12-inch chamber at the center of the core. An attempt to improve
the resolution of these data may be made by consideration of the results
for the 43 123 203 and 24-inch chambers at the center of the core. The
reactivity effects for these chambers relative to the water-filled control-
rod aperture are tabulated below:
O
!
Chamber L_K/K, percent AK/K Inch*
Nominal length_ Weight_ Volume_ Air chamber
in. gm cc filled void
4
12
2O
24
24
168.6
375 .I
520.7
604. i
605.2
145
418
725
85O
859
0.087
.156
.075
.052
.024
Water Void
filled effect
0.054 0. 055
.051 .105
.029 .044
.032 .000
.035 - .009
0.0153
.0088
.0022
.0000
-.0004
_ne inch chamber length is equivalent to 55.5 cc of void.
The reactivity per inch of chamber void tabulated is plotted in fig-
ure 12 against chamber length (one-in. of chamber length is equivalent
to 55.5 cc of void). The data indicate a reasonably smooth curvej which
extrapolated to zero chamber length_ indicates the differential void ef-
fect at the core midplane. In a similar manner_ the void effect curves
of figures i0 and ll for the 4-inch and 12-inch chambers may be plotted
and curves extrapolated to zero chamber length_ several of these curves
are shown.
The resulting differential void effect curve is shown in figure 15
as the variation of fractional void coefficient with core height. This
fractional void coefficient LZ</K/AV/VH20 expresses the percent change
in reactivity per percent displacement of water from the core. For pur-
poses of deriving these void coefficientsj it was assumed that the 7 by
5 fuel element loading cdnsisted of standard fuel elements. The water
volume was taken to be 47_050 cc and the aluminum volume of the core was
taken to be 54_i00 cc resulting in an aluminum-water volume ratio of 0.726.
Therefore one inch of chamber length_ which is equivalent to 55.5 cc of
void_ represents 0.0755 percent displacement of the water volume of the
core.
The differential void effect curve_ shown in figure 13_ is most ac-
curate near the core midplane} although the negative reactivity portions
of the curve have been extrapolated; the measured void effects for the
chambers used are reasonably well integrated from the curve. The positive
void effect from -7 inches to +7 inches relative to the core midplane (a
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void of 500 cc) is +O.135 AK/K percent} the void effect for the entire
height of the core (a void of about 850 cc or 50 cu in.) is closely zero
dK/K.
These results indicate that for somereactor designsj displacement
of water by air or steam in regions of high _;tatistical importance can
introduce significant positive reactivities. Although continued displace-
ment of water will finally introduce strong Legative reactivities_ a nega-
tive void coefficient may not always exist.
The reactivity effects of the 24-inch c_amber filled with various
materials relative to the water-filled contr¢l rod aperture are tabulated
below:
Chamber
Nominal length 3
in.
24
24
Weight_
gm
604. i
603.2
Volume_
cc
85O
859
Meterial in
chamber
Graphite
powder
(475.9
Water
Air
SiLica
_erogel
(76.9
Wa_er
Ai _
percent
+0.158
+.032
+.032
+0.032
+.033
+.024
It may be seen that displacement of wate" by graphite powder (ap-
parent density 0.56) introduced a net reactivity of +0.126 z_K/K. Dis-
placement of water by silica aerogel (apparel; density 0.089) introduced
a net reactivity of -0.001 ZkK/K. In both ca_es_ the very low absorptiv-
ity but significant scattering properties of ;hese materials_ resulted
in a positive reactivity over the cases in wh:ch the chambers were air
filled and so effectively voided.
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REACTIVITY EFFECTS OF VOIDING FUEL ELI_NT WATER PASSAGES
A standard fuel element was modified by _elding aluminum manifolds
to the top and bottom so that the seventeen individual water passages
between fuel plates could be selectively voided in any combination. The
water passages were voided by blowing air through any of 34 plastic air
tubes extending from the top of the reactor pcol to the modified fuel
assembly in the core. This modified fuel assembly occupied successively
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the number 25 grid position at the center of the core and the number 35
grid position at the interface of the core and the thick BeO reflector
(the 35 grid position corresponds to the "hot-spot" region in the NACA
Research Reactor core).
The water passages were voided in two sequences. One sequence was
used in which the interactions of each voided water passage were minimized
by keeping the voided passages as far apart as possible. A second se-
quence was used in which the interactions were maximized by successively
voiding adjacent water passages and so enlarging the voided region at the
center of the fuel element° These sequences are illustrated in figure 14
in which the 17 water passages are lettered. The successive order of
voiding and water passages voided are indicated. In these sequences as
many as twelve water passages were voided cummulatively. A leak between
water passages i and j in sequence I necessitated voiding these two
passages simultaneously.
The reactivity per incremental water passage voided in the maximum
interaction sequence I for the 25 grid position is presented in figure
15(a). The reactivity per incremental water passage voided in the mini-
mum interaction sequence II for the _5 and 35 grid positions are presented
in figure 15(b). Voiding of water passages in all cases introduced nega-
tive reactivity.
It would have been interesting to have measured the worth of partial-
ly voided water passages_ from the data presented for voids in the aper-
ture of the control-rod fuel element_ one would expect positive reactivity
to be introduced by voiding parts of individual water passages near the
center of the core.
The reactivity per incremental water passage voided is not very
greatly effected by the sequence of voiding indicating that there is lit-
tle interaction between the voided water passages. However 3 reactivity
per passage is somewhat greater for sequence I than for sequence II for
the fuel element in the 25 grid position. The lowered reactivity per
passage for sequence II in the 35 grid position is an indication of the
reduced statistical importance of this reflector region relative to the
central core region.
The cumulative effects of these sequences is presented in figure 16
as the total reactivity introduced as a function of the number of water
passages successively voided expressed as a percentage of the water volume
in the core. The slopes of these curves represent the fractional void
coefficient. For purposes of deriving these void coefficients_ it was
assumed that the 7 by 3 fuel element loading consisted of standard fuel
elements. The water volume of the core was taken to be 473030 cc and the
aluminum volume of the core was taken to be 343100 cc resulting in an
aluminum-water volume ratio of 0.726. Each water passage contains 123.8
cc and represents 0.263 percent displacement of the water volume of the
core. The fractional void coefficients g_K/K/AV/VH20___ are tabulated on
figure 16.
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REACTIVITYEFFECTSOFREMOVINGFUELI_EMENTPLATES
A standard fuel element_ in which twelve of the eighteen fuel plates
were removable, occupied the 25 grid position at the center of the core
loading. These fuel plates were removed in two sequences. Onesequence
was used in which the interactions of each pla_e were minimized by remov-
ing plates farthest apart from each other. A :_econdsequence was used in
which the interactions were maximized by succe:;sively removing adjacent
fuel plates and so forming an increasingly lar_[e water region near the
center of the loading. These sequencesare ill.ustrated in figure 17 in
which the removable fuel plates are lettered (:'uel plates near the center
of the element were not removable due to obstruction by the fuel element
handle). The successive order of removal is indicated.
The reactivity per incremental fuel plate removed in the maximum
interaction sequenceI is presented in figure }8(a). Similar data for
the minimuminteraction sequenceII is presented in figure 18(b). Re-
moval of fuel plates and consequent enlargemen_of water regions in all
cases introduced negative reactivity. The reactivity per incremental
fuel plate removedis very greatly effected by the sequence of removal.
In sequence I, for example_worth of adjacent Tuel plates 3 increases
rapidly as the region devoid of fuel enlarges. On the other hand in se-
quence II, individual fuel plates from opposite sides of the element have
equal worth; the worth of fuel plates from intermediate positions in the
element increases slowly.
In these removable fuel plate sequences a_ailable core excess re-
activity permitted eleven fuel plates to be reroved; removal of the
twelfth plate_ number D 3 in the maximum intera(tion sequence I shut down
the reactor _en the plate was 45 percent withcrawn from the core. At
this point the regulating rod was fully withdrawn from the core indicating
this portion of the twelfth fuel plate to be w(rth 0.16 2H{/K percent.
The accumulated reactivity of the first eleven fuel plates was 2.56 per-
cent. The total excess reactivity available i_ BSR core loading 55 is
estimated therefore to be 2.52 percent. The c¢mplete twelfth fuel plate
is estimated to be worth at least 0.16/0.45 = (.56 2_/K percent. This
point is shown in figure 18(a) as a flagged da_a point.
The worth of the twelfth fuel plate in the minimum interaction se-
quence II is readily estimated by subtracting ¢ummulative reactivity of
sequence II - step ii from the cummulative reactivity of sequence I -
step 12. A reactivity of 0._8 ZkK/K percent for this fuel plate is shown
in figure 18(b) as a flagged data point.
The cummulative effects of these sequences is presented in figure i9
as the total reactivity introduced as a functicn of mass of uranium re-
moved (each fuel plate is assumed to contain 7.78 grams of fully enriched
uranium). The data of each sequence have been extrapolated to estimate
the reactivity of the entire 140 gram fuel ele_ent in the number 25 grid
position_ this fuel element is estimated to be worth approximately 6
Z_K/K percent.
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CONCLUSIONS
From the results of these experiments at the Bulk Shielding Reactor
certain conclusions may be drawn regarding hazards which might be en-
countered with a gas-cooled test at the center of the NACA Research Re-
actor core. The data show that no net reactivity is inserted if a voided
chamber without fuel about I inch by 2 inches in section extending the
full height of the core is completely flooded. This chamber contains a
void volume of 50 cubic inches. If a gas-cooled fueled experiment with
the same volume is flooded the data show that a reactivity of +0.65 per-
cent is inserted. This result would apply for an experiment which con-
tains 50 grams of uranium-235 distributed as it is in four adjacent BSR
fuel plates.
Tests containing voids and no fuel which occupy less than the full
height of the core and are centered on the horizontal midplane would
introduce a negative reactivity upon accidental flooding and so tend to
shut down the reactor. This is indicated by the data for the smaller
chambers_ for example_ a chamber I inch by 2 inches by 12 inches located
centrally in the core introduced -0.i0 percent reactivity when flooded
with water. No data were obtained for chambers containing fuel and voids.
The data also indicate that removal of fuel from the center of the
reactor is always safe. This effect amounted to about -0.011 percent re-
activity per gram of uranium-235 for small amounts removed and corresponds
to -0.085 percent reactivity for removal of a single BSR fuel plate in the
central fuel element°
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Figure 2. - Standard control rod fuel element _ith typical aluminum chamber
partially inserted.
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Figure Z. - Removable fuel plat. assembly.
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BSR standard fuel element
°ii
]] .... i
a b c d e f g h 1 J k 1 m n o p q
17 Voldable water passages
Maximum Interactlon Sequence I
i h
2 i J
3 h I j
4 h i J k
5 g h i J k
6 g h ! J k i
7 f g h i J k i
8 f g h I J k 1 m
9 e f g h i J k 1 m
lO e f g h i J k 1 m n
ll d e f g h i J k 1 m n
19 d e f g h i J k 1 m n o
Minimum interaction Sequence II
1 a
2 a q
5 a k q
4 a e k q
5 a e k m q
8 a c e k m q
7 a c e k m o q
8 a c e g k m o q
9 a c e g i k m o q
i0 a c e g 1 J k m o q
Figure 14. - Sequences of voiding water passages in manifolded fuel element.
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BSR standard ftel element
::H 1
A B C D E F G H I J K L
12 Removable fuel plates
Maxlmum interaction Sequence I
!
O
1 j
2 J K
3 I J K
4 H I J K
5 H I J K L
6 G H I J K
7 F G H I J K L
8 A F G H I J K L ]
9 A B F G H I J K L
i0 A B C F G H I J K L
Ii A B C E F G H I J K L
12 A B C D E F G H I J K L I
M1nlmum Interactlon Sequence II
1 A
2 A L
3 A F L
4 A E F L
S A E F J L
6 A C E F J L
7 A C E F H J L
8 A C E F H J K L
9 A B C E F H J K L
i0 A B C E F G H J K L
ii A B C D E F G H J K L
Flgure 17. - Sequences of removlng fuel plates In standard fuel element.
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(b) Minimum interaction Sequence If.
Figure 18. - Reactivity per incremental fuel element plate removed.
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IV. ANSWERS TO MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS RAISED
BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
March 26_ 1957
In order to clarify certain points relative to the safety of the
proposed NACA Reactor Facility, the Atomic Energy Commission, in a letter
(ref. i), has requested written answers to a number of miscellaneous
questions. These questions had previously been discussed informally in
conversation between representatives of the NACA and the AEC. The answers
to the six questions of the AEC letter are given herein.
i. QUESTION I
"As a consequence of malfunction or misoperation of experiment equip-
ment, or in the remote possibility of catastrophic accident to the reactor
itself, fission products may be released into the vapor shell. The prob-
ability of release of these radioactive materials from the outer vapor
container in amounts which would be hazardous to adjacent public areas
must be reduced to an acceptable minimum. In order to determine that
this has been accomplished, it is necessary to know, among other things,
the maximum rate at which it is expected fission products can escape from
the vapor container together with an indication of how these rates were
determined. This should include the releases expected from the operation
of the airlocks as personnel escape from an accident."
The ability of the containment structure to withstand the effects of
the worst conceivable accident, and to maintain the integrity of the con-
tainment tank (outer vapor container) has been discussed at length in the
Hazards Summary report (ref. 2_ section 6.4). The maximum rate at which
it is expected that fission products could escape from the contalmment
tank is determined by the leakage of air borne fission products out of
the containment tank. The discussion of leakage of air borne fission
products from the containment tank will be divided into two parts. First
the maximum allowable leakage will be considered. Then the design of the
containment tank and the methods of checking it so as to assure the main-
tenance of acceptable leakage rates will be discussed.
l.iAllowable Leakage Rate
The order of consideration in the establishment of a maximum allow-
able leakage rate will be
i. Allowable radiation exposure for public in the event of the worst
conceivable release of activity
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2. Worst conceivable fission product concentration in the air of
the containment tank
3. Meteorology as related to the dispers _onof fission products
4. Establishment of allowable leakage ra;e
i.i.i Allowable radiation exposure for p_lic. - In areas open to
the public, the allowable concentration of fi_sion products in air, in
the event of the worst conceivable fission p_duct release, is taken to
be such that the average exposure over 13 wee]m shall not exceed the
limits specified in Federal Register, Part 20 Title i0, CFR (ref. 5)
for areas where people regularly reside. Thil_ is a reasonable criteria
since the AEC will accept applications for licenses for the release of
fission products in larger than normal amounts provided this above cri-
teria is maintained and provided the half-life in the body of the fission
products is less than 60 days (ref. 3). All the gaseous fission products
of consequence have half-lives in the body of less than 60 days. The
allowable concentration in air for areas where people regularly reside
is used for all areas open to the public becm_se, in the case of the NACA
reactor, the distance from the reactor to the closest point open to the
public, and to the closest residence are abo_ the same.
1.1.2 Worst conceivable fission product (oncentration in the air of
the containment tank. - The most serious conceivable release of fission
products would be the result of a catastrophi( accident to the reactor
itself. The fission product inventory at the time of this accident de-
pends on the operating history of the reactor. The reactor operation has
been discussed in the Hazards Summary (ref. 2_ Section 2.2) and will be re-
viewed briefly. The reactor is designed to o_erate for a ten day operating
cycle at a constant average power density of _00 watts/cc of active core.
This average power density will give a power of about 30 megawatts
at startup when the control rods are about half-way in the reactor and
the top half of the reactor is inactive. As time passes and the control
rods are withdrawn, the power level will be increased to maintain the
average power density of 600 watts/cc. The reactor will not actually
generate 60 megawatts until perhaps the last day of the operating cycle.
The total operating time would be 240 hours anl the average power over
the entire operation period would be 40 to SC megawatts. The down time
between operating cycles would be of the order of at least several days.
Partially spent fuel elements from the corner of the loading would be
moved to the center and new fuel elements woull replace these, as des-
cribed in the Hazards S_ (ref. 2, section 2.2.2). Then a new oper-
ating cycle would begin.
Because of the mode of operation at varyimg total power, the inde-
terminate length of down time between operating cycles, and the shifting
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of fuel elements between operating cycles, the calculation of the exact
fission product inventory is more complex than is warranted. Accordingly
a conservative assumption was made that the maximum fission product in-
ventory was that which corresponded to a reactor operating continuously
at 60 megawatts for a period long enough to saturate all the gaseous
fission products of significance. It was then further assumed that all
the gaseous fission products in the inventory were released in the acci-
dent and mixed uniformly in the 451,000 cubic feet of air in the con-
tainment tank. The gaseous fission products considered were
Kr83 Xe 133 Br 83 1131
Kr 83 (2 isomers) Xe 135 (2 isomers) Br 84 1132
Kr87 Xe 137 Br 83 1133
Kr 88 Xe 138 Br 87 1134
Kr 89 Xe 139 Br88 i13S
Kr 90 Xe 140 i136
All fission products were assumed saturated except the long lived isomer
of Kr $5. Only a negligible amount of this fission product would be
present.
It was further assumed that all of these fission products remained
in the air of the containment tank for the entire length of time con-
sidered (13 weeks). This is a rather conservative assumption inasmuch
as the boiling points of bromine and iodine are 138 ° F and 361 ° F,
respectively, and it might be expected that a considerable amount of
these products would condense out in a thirteen week period. The effect
of this assumption on the allowable leakage rate will be discussed later.
Since very low leakage rates over long periods of time are being
considered, it is expected that a large portion of the nongaseous air-
borne activity would be deposited on the walls and floors of the con-
tainment tank or "filtered out" at the leak locations. Therefore, the
nongaseous fission products were not considered. It is felt that any
optimism in this assumption is more than compensated for by the conser-
vatism inherent in assuming that there are 60 megawatts of saturated
fission products in the inventory and that none of the bromine or iodine
is condensed out of the air during the entire period under consideration.
In summary, the worst conceivable fission product concentration in
air in the containment tank will be taken to be that resulting from the
uniform distribution in the air of the containment tank of all the gaseous
fission products resulting from the operation of a 60 megawatt reactor
13S
to fission product saturation. It will be ass_imedthat none of the io-
dine or bromine will condense out of the air in the containment tank
during the period in question (13 weeks).
1.1.3 Meteorology as related to fission product dispersion. - The
meteorology of the NACA reactor site is discussed in appendix C of the
Hazards Summary (ref. 2). All the site meteorology data used in this
section come from this appendix.
In order to compute the 13-week average c)ncentration of fission
products per unit rate of activity release at _ny point of interest, it
is necessary to compute the instantaneous concmtrations at the point
of interest for the various types of meteorological conditions encoun-
tered and then to sum this over the 13-week period, weighting each type
of meteorological condition according to its r_lative frequency.
The instantaneous concentrations for vari_Dus types of meteorological
conditions were computed using figure 9.1, of i_4eteorology and Atomic
Energy (ref. 4). The assumptions used in performing these calculations
are discussed briefly below:
i. Type of source: Since leakage over a Long period is being con-
sidered and since the points of interest are distant from the reactor,
a continuous point source was assumed.
2. Height of release: Release at ground Level was assumed, since
this results in the maximum fission product concentrations at the points
of interest.
3. Distance from the source: The closest areas open the the public
are to the North and Northeast (see ref. 2, fi_. J-16). In both of these
directions the fence is 3000 feet from the rea_tor. Accordingly, a dis-
tance from the source of 5000 feet was used in the calculations.
A. Wind speeds: The wind speeds were broken into four groups and
the average velocity of each group was used. Fnese velocities were 1.5,
5.5, i0, and 16 mph.
5. Sutton diffusion parameters n and C2: The Sutton stability
parameter n is a function of lapse rate. C2 is a function of n and
wind velocity. In the site meteorology data, the Weather Bureau only
distinguishes between "inversion" and no inversion. For average inver-
sion conditions, n was taken as 0.40 and C 2 as 0.006 for all wind
,I OsDeeds. For average n inversion conditions," n was taken as 0.22 and
C_ varied from 0.09 to 0.06 with increasing w_nd speed. These values
were taken from table A.3 and figure 9.4 of reference 4.
!
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The items needed in order to determine the average concentration over
13 weeks at the points of interest are discussed below.
i. Season of the year: Because it combines a large percentage of
inversions with a high frequency of unfavorable wind directions and
speeds, summer is probably the worst season and it was used in the
computations.
2. Frequency of general wind direction: As described in (2) above,
the directions of the nearest areas open to the public are North and
Northeast. The relative frequency of wind direction in the summer is
15 percent from the South and 21 percent from the Southwest. The chief
point of interest is therefore in the Northeast direction (winds from
the Southwest) and the frequency of this general wind direction is 21
percent.
3. Frequency of various wind speeds: These are taken from the site
meteorology data.
A. Frequency of various lapse conditions: These are also taken
from the site meteorology data.
5. Reduction in concentration with distance from centerline of
radioactive cloud: The frequency of the general wind direction is given
above as 21 percent in the direction of interest, Northeast. It is
assumed that all wind directions in the Northeast sector are equally
probable with respect to one another. That is, it is assumed that when
the wind is blowing in the Northeast direction, the centerline of the
radioactive cloud may be anywhere in the Northeast sector with equal
probability. The reduction in concentration with distance from the
radioactive cloud centerline is determined from figure 9.3 of reference
using a distance of 5000 feet and the Sutton diffusion parameter dis-
cussed above.
Using the assumptions indicated above, the iS-week average concen-
tration at the critical point (at the fence in the Northeast direction)
was calculated to be 2.8><10 -6 _c/ml, per curie/sec released.
l.l.& Allowable leakage rate. The concentration of gaseous fis-
sion products per cubic foot of air in the containment tank was computed
as described i_ 2.1.2 for each of the fission products tabulated in
1.1.2. The activity of each fission product as a function of time after
the catastrophe was taken from reference 5. From this information, the
rate of release of activity in curies/sec, per cubic foot/sec of leakage,
was determined for each individual fission product as a function of time.
This rate of activity release was then integrated mechanically to give
the 13-week average rate of activity release for each individual fission
product. Using this information, the 13-week average concentration per
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unit rate of activity release at the point of interest given in 1.1.5,
and the criteria for allowable concentration ([iscussed in i.i.I, an
allowable leakage rate of 15 cubic feet per di_ywas established.
As mentioned previously in 1.1.2, it is possible that someof the
bromine and iodine would condense out of the l_ir in the containment tank
during the 15-week period under consideration. If any portion of the
iodine does condense out, this would appreciably increase the allowable
leakage rate, iodine being the worst offender of the gaseous fission
products, e.g., if half the iodine condensedout, the leakage rate could
be as high as 30 cu ft/day and still not resu_t in excessive concentra"
tions in the critical areas.
In the event that the fission product release in the containment
tank is from an experiment rather than from the reactor itself, the
fission product concentration would be much lower than assumedabove
since the largest experiments contemplated are about one megawatt.
In this case, the allowable leakage rate coull reach 900 cu ft/day and
not result in excessive concentrations in the critical areas.
To aid in the cleanup of radioactive rel_ases in the containment
tank, a high efficiency silver nitrate packed tower, such as is presently
in use at Hanford, will be installed to remow_iodine from the fission
gases. The tower will only be used in the event of a radioactive re-
lease. The flow capacity is such that the iodine concentration could be
reduced about a factor of two each 24 hours. This loop can be operated
from the fan house. The allowable leakage rase from the containment
tank could be considerably increased, if aceon_t were taken of this io-
dine removal, hut inasmuchas the problem of iaaintaining a leakage rate
of 15 cu ft/day is not muchdifferent from th_ problem of maintaining
a leakage rate of i00 cu ft/day, it was decided not to rely on the io-
dine removal. The iodine removal equipment, _hen, constitutes another
safety factor.
!
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1.2 Design and Testing of the Containment Tank
The requirement that the leakage rate not exceed 15 cubic feet per
day at the maximum pressure likely to be encolntered (2 psi, ref. 2,
appendix H), determined much of the containment tank design and testing
procedure. The design and testing of the following items will be
discussed:
i. Containment tank welds
2. Pipe penetrations
5. Wire and cable penetrations
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¢. Ventilation system
5. Canal lift gate
6. Truck door
7. Air locks
1.2.1 Containment tank welds. - All containment tank welds are to
be shielded arc, submerged arc, or equivalent welds. All seams in the
tank bottom will be lapped and fillet welded with 3/8" fillet weld ex-
cept seams in the spherically shaped part of the bottom which will be
butt welded. Radial seams in the sole plate will be single-butt welds
with back-up strips. All seams above the flat bottom plate will be full
throat, complete penetration, butt welds.
Each procedure of welding will be in accordance with Section IX of
the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the contractor will be re-
quired to keep a detailed record of this procedure. The contractor will
be required to submit each welding procedure for approval before welding.
All the contractors welders will be required to pass qualification tests
prescribed in Section IX of the ASME code.
All welds which are accessible from both sides will be radiographed
and tested with a Freon or ammonia leak detector, or equivalent. Those
welds which are accessible from only one side (welds in the tank bottom)
will be checked with a vacuum seam tester. These latter welds in the
tank bottom are less critical inasmuch as the space between the tank and
the earth will be pressure grouted and any leakage would have to come up
through the grout.
1.2.2 Pipe penetrations. - The pipe penetrations will be fillet
welded on both sides. The minimum depth of fillet will be 1/4 inch.
The welds will be checked with a vacuum seam tester and with a Freon or
ammonia leak detector, or equivalent.
All pipes penetrating the containment tank which might conceivably
be in use during the operation of the reactor will have emergency shut
off valves which will close in the event of overpressure in the con-
tainment tank.
1.2.5 Wire and cable penetrations. - Design of a typical wire or
cable penetration and associated vacuum system is shown in figure i.
A standard pipe coupling, size as required, is welded into the contain-
ment tank. The welding procedure and check is the same as described in
1.2.2 for pipe penetrations. Each end of the pipe coupling is fitted
with a seal adapter. Sealant retaining plates are cut to fit wire or
cable and installed. Sealant is injected and allowed to cure. The
1_2
space between the two seals is maintained at vacuum during reactor op-
eration. The seals are expected to be essentially leakproof and the
vacuum system is used primarily to detect excessive leakage. If the
pumping rate of the vacuum pump exceeds a predetermined amount, the re-
actor would be shut down immediately and the seals checked until the
faulty ones were discovered and repaired.
The vacuum pump system discharges back into the containment tank
and so even the small leakages which are permitted are not discharged
to the atmosphere but returned to the containment tank.
1.2.4 Ventilation system. - The contairnuent tank ventilating system
has been described in the Hazards Summary (ref. 2, section 2.1). Some
changes have been made and some additional detail is now available. The
ventilation system for the i00 foot containnent vessel are shown in fig-
ure 2. Ventilation air will be drawn into the shell at a rate of 400
cubic feet per minute through a filter, two check valves, and a spring-
loaded solenoid valve in the 6 inch line. The pressure in the tank will
be held at one inch of water below atmospheric. The discharge air passes
through another spring-loaded solenoid valve and is compressed to 300 psi
by two 200 cfm reciprocating compressors. Four accumulator bottles will
be provided for the compressed air, each large enough to run the compres-
sors for 2 and 1/2 minutes without discharging to atmosphere.
Monitors will be placed in the system a_ shown. The spring-loaded
solenoid valves will close and the compressors stop if any of the fol-
lowing occurs:
i. Reactor power goes up to 1.5 times n_rmal
2. High activity in the containment ves _el
3. High activity in the outlet line
4. High activity in the accumulator bot;les
5. High pressure in the containment ves:;el
Although the bottles will operate at 30c) psi, they will be designed
for a pressure of 600 psi with allowable des:gn stresses one-quarter of
the ultimate stress for the material used. [!anks three feet in diameter
by approximately seven feet long have the required volume of 50 cubic
feet per tank. Such tanks would be 0.75 incl_ thick if constructed of
carbon steel.
1.2.5 Canal lift gate. - The location oI the vertical lift gate
between the containment tank and the canal _y be seen in the Hazards
Summary (ref. 2, fig. 2.12). Details of the lift gate seal are shown
_O
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in figure 3. Only a single seal is used here because, in operation,
the outside of the lift gate will have a head of ii feet of water above
the top of the gate. The leakage, if any, would therefore be inward
even in the event of the 2 psi pressure on the tank resulting from the
worst conceivable accident (ref. 2, appendix H). The gasket in the
seal will be of neoprene conforming to ASTM specification D-735-54T,
type S. Leakage in the seal would be determined by damp spots on the
inside of the seal.
The canal lift gate; and the truck door _d air lock doors discussed
in subsequent paragraphs (1.2.6 and 1.2.7), are all designed so that an
increase in pressure in the containment tank would increase the force
on the gaskets of the seal.
1.2.6 Truck door. - The location of the truck door in the contain-
ment tank is shown in the Hazsmds Summary (ref. 2, fig. 2.12). Details
of the truck door seal are shown in figure 3. A double gasket is used
here and a vacuum is maintained between the two gaskets by the same
vacuum pump as is used for the wire and cable penetrations. As in the
case of the wire and cable penetrations (1.2.2) excessive leakage would
be determined by the pumping rate of the vacuum pump and would force a
reactor shutdown. All leakage is pumped back into the containment tank.
The gasket material is neoprene of the same specification as for the
canal lift gate (1.2.5).
1.2.7 Air locks. - The location of the two air locks are shown in
the Hazards Summary (ref. 2, fig. 2.12). Details of the air lock and
the air-lock seals are shown in figure 4. The proper operation of the
air locks is insured in two different ways. First, there is a mechan-
ical interlock which prevents either air lock door from being opened
unless the other is closed and dogged. Secondly, there is a pressure
system which always maintains a 1/2 inch water differential pressure
across both doors, the pressure being such that the air flow through
the door when it is open is always inward.
A schematic diagram of the air lock pressure system is shown in
figure 5, and its operation will be described briefly. Two different
pressure controllers are used, one controlling the pressure across each
door. Each controller is set to maintain 1/2 inch water differentials
during normal operation. The control (output) pressure from each con-
troller is fed through a selector valve, the position of which can be
controlled from the three areas in question (the containment tank, the
air lock, and the building).
In the event of an accident which raises the pressure inside the
containment tank above that in the air lock the operation of the inside
air lock door would be prevented because of pressure force on the
inward-swinging door. Operation of the selector valve would reestablish
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the original 1/2 inch differential pressure and the door could then be
opened. Once inside the lock with the inner door closed behind, the
selector valve is repositioned and the air pressure bleeds off to give
proper differential across outside door. (lh'essure will again prevent
premature opening of the door). Air removed from air lock is pumped
back into the containment tank.
The air lock pressure system insures that the pressure differential
across the air lock doors is such that the air flow is always inward
when either air lock door is open, both in normal operation and in the
event of containment tank overpressure. An individual in entering the
air lock would therefore bring very little if any containment tank air
with him when he entered the lock. Inasmuch as the prevalent air flow
is into the containment tank, a rough estimate of the amount of con-
tainment tank air that might be forced into the air lock by one indi-
viduals body motion is about 5 cubic feet. Ehese 5 cubic feet would mix
in the volume of the air lock which is about 500 cubic feet and be di-
luted. Since the prevalent air flow is agair inward when the air lock
outer door is opened, perhaps 5 cubic feet of the air lock mixture might
be forced out by one individuals body motion. Thus, the passage of one
individual through the air lock would release the equivalent of about
1/20 of a cubic foot of containment tank air.
The ventilating system of the containmer_t tank provides, during re-
actor operation, only enough air for ten people. The number of personnel
normally in the containment tank would be less than this. The exit of
all personnel consecutively through one air lock would result in the
emission of only about 3 cubic feet of containment tank air. This is
not serious inasmuch as the allowable leakage rate is i5 cubic feet per
day for thirteen weeks.
1.2.8 Summary. - With the design and testing methods described in
1.2.1 through 1.2.7, it is felt that a leakag_ rate from the containment
tank lower than the allowable leakage rate of iS cubic feet per day
could be maintained. The operating policy relative to leakage rate main-
tenance will be that appreciable leaks would oe located and repaired as
soon as they became noticeable, even though t ae total leakage rate from
the containment tank were less than allowable.
!
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2. QUESTION 2
"It is the experience elsewhere that radioactivity releases from
the experimental equipment around the reactor will occur. This may
likely occur also in the NACA reactor. Since this reactor is to be lo-
cated in an area of high population density, Large amounts of radio-
activity cannot be discharged to the atmosphe._e. Thus, if the reactor
is to continue to operate after such radioactLve releases, some feasible
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method of decontmainating the building _{ithout release of hazardous
amount of radioactivity to the surrounding area must be devised. To
detemine whether you have adequately provided for such contingencies,
we need an outline of your general approach to this problem."
The discussion of this point will be divided into two parts. The
approach to the problem of trying to prevent uncontrolled radioactive
releases in the containment tank or in the hot lab will be considered
first. Then the approach to the cleanup problem in the event that there
are releases in spite of all precautions will be considered.
2.1 Control of Radioactive Releases
2.1.1 The experiment container tank. As observed in reference i,
radioactive releases from experimental equipment will occur. This point
is well taken. It is proposed that the experimental loops will be de-
signed as carefully as possible and their operation checked by running
out of pile tests of the loops prior to their insertion in the reactor,
but in spite of all precautions of this type it is anticipated that some
radioactive releases from the experimental loops will occur. This is
particularly true with respect to those loops in which fuel elements
will be operated in damaged condition. In order to prevent these re-
leases from unduly hampering reactor operation it will be normal proce-
dure to complete "can" all hazardous experiments. An experiment con-
tainer tank will enclose every pumped loop or other dangerous experiment.
The primary coolant will always be recirculated entirely within the ex-
periment container tank. Only secondary coolant lines, and instrument
and power leads will penetrate the container. It is anticipated that
the experiment container can will be of the order of 6-10 feet in diam-
eter and 10-1S feet long with a snout about 8 feet long which goes into
the test hole in the reactor.
The experiment container will be designed, constructed, and tested
with all the care given the containment tank of the reactor itself. All
penetrations of the experiment container will be of the same type as the
similar penetrations of the reactor containment tank discussed in the
previous section (section 1.2). The experiment container will be main-
tained at low levels of temperature and stress and its only function
will be containment.
This high integrity experiment container is not as much "extra work"
in the NACA reactor as it would be in other reactors, since it would be
located in one of the quadrants of the shielding pool and some type of
water tight container would be necessary in any event.
Brookhaven National Laboratory and the MTR were visited recently by
NACA personnel and discussions took place with the operating personnel of
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the proposed method of handling pumpedloops, in particular the idea of the
experiment container tank. A similar visit to ORNLis to be madewithin a
week. The people at Brookhavenhad run one in-pile pumploop experiment
which approximated someof the conditions of relevance. The loop was
canned in two different sections and though leaks were encountered in
both sections of the loop, radioactive material never escaped from the
container cans. Brookhaven is currently designing and building a larger
version of this loop, which will be canned, and do not anticipate any
great difficulties in restricting radioactive releases to the container
cs_ns.
A visit wasmadeto the MTRfor the specffal purpose of learning
from M_Roperating persormel the troubles that they have experienced
with large pumpedloops. In addition, the NACAmethod of handling pumped
loops was described and discussed with them. It was learned that the re-
leases which have caused building evacuations would have been prevented
had the experiments been "canned" as is planned to be done in the NACA
reactor. The project engineers who were talked to at the M_Rwere unan-
imous in their favorable opinion of the NACA_ethod of handling experi-
ments. Their only criticism of the method was that they believed that
the maintenance work would be more inconvenient to do because the ex-
periments must be removedfrom the reactor each time repairs are
necessary.
2..1.2 Leak philosophy. - The philosophy with respect to leaks in
the reactor containment tank or in the experiment container tank is as
follows. If the leakage from the reactor containment tank exceeds the
allowable leakage of 15 cu ft/day, the reacto_ will be shut down immed-
iately and will remain down until the leakage is reduced to permissible
values. In general, any appreciable leak woulff be repaired as soon as
possible after it was detected, even though the total leakage rate from
the containment tank was less than IS cu ft/dsy. A leakage rate of IS
cu ft/day would shut the reactor down regardless of surrounding
circumstances.
An allowable leakage rate will be establ_shed for each experiment
container tank dependent on the experiment it contains. As in the case
of the containment tank_ any appreciable leak would be repaired as soon
as possible even though the total leak from tke experiment container was
less th_n allowable. If the leakage rate fro_ the experiment container
exceeds the allowable value procedure will de_end upon the status of
the experiment. If the experiment has, prior to this time, released
radioactivity into the experiment container, then the experiment and the
reactor will both be shut down.
If the leakage rate from the experiment container exceeds the allow-
able and the experiment has not released radicactivity into the experiment
container, the experiment alone will be shut down, with only a few ex-
ceptions. In the event of an experiment so i_portant that it is deemed
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worthwhile to risk contamination of the reactor containment tank to
finish running the experiment_ the experiment would be permitted to con-
tinue to operate. However, no experiment with a damaged fuel element
would be permitted to continue in such a case.
If the leakage rate is not excessive in either the reactor contain-
ment tank or the experiment container tank, then it is proposed that
operation be continued even though there are radioactive releases from
the experiment to the experiment container tank.
2.1.5 Operating _rocedure. - As stated previously, the experimental
loop would be designed and fabricated as carefully as possible. It would
be tested out of pile as completely as possible. It would then be placed
in its container tank (which had been tested previously) and both experi-
ment and container tank would be tested as completely as possible. The
experiment and its container would then be moved to the reactor building
as a unit and located in the shielding pool quadrant while the reactor
is down and the quadrant dry. The snout would be inserted in the test
hole. All the secondary coolant lines and instrument and power leads
which possibly could_ would be designed to come up above the level of
the top of the shielding pool and the disconnects would be located in
air at all times. All handling equipment necessary for the removal of
the experiment would be ready and the removal procedure would be re-
hearsed before the experiment is irradiated. The quadrant would then be
flooded prior to reactor start up.
When the experiment is completed, all lines leaving the experiment
container would be closed off and disconnected, "afterheat system" cool-
ant and power lines would be connected (these lines provide power and
secondary coolant for the afterheat removal system), and the experiment
would be removed entirely underwater to the wet storage areaof the hot
handling section where it will norn_lly be allowed to cool for about 90
days to reduce the level of fission product activity. It is possible
that this decay time could be cut down if it becomes desirable (and
feasible from the standpoint of after-heat) to dismantle the experiment
after a shorter time.
It is planned to bottle the experiment off-gases at moderate pres-
sure. They will be drawn from the experimental container by a vacuum
pump in cases where the entire container has been contaminated. In
cases where the fuel element is still intact, the vacuum pump will be
connected to an enclosure surrounding the machine used to penetrate into
the fuel region. Discharge from the vacuum pump will be compressed by
another pump which will discharge into one of a group of storage bottles.
The second pump and the storage bottles will be located in a pressure
vessel so that there will be effectively double containment for the off-
gases. It is presently planned that a high efficiency silver nitrate
packed tower, such as is now in use at Hanford_ will be installed to
remove iodine from the off-gases. Discharge of the off-gases through
the iodine remover and out the stack will be permitted only under fav-
able weather conditions.
The iodine removal equipment will afford several advantages. It
will reduce appreciably the storage time for off-gases. In the event of
leakage from the storage bottles, the bottle snclosing vessel can be
purged of contamination through this equipment. In the event of contam-
ination of the i00 foot containment vessel, downtime can be reduced by
recirculating vessel air through the tower. If the high efficiency units
becomeunfeasible for any reason, most of the sametype of advantages can
be secured with lower efficiency caustic scrubbers by recirculating until
the required clean-up is attained.
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2.2 Cleanup of Uncontrolled Radic_ctive Releases
If in spite of all precautions a radioactive release occurs, the
principal hazard as far as off-site personnel are concerned are the
fission gases. Once the fission gases have been safely disposed of and
the contaminated shielding pool water stored in the hot retention basins,
orderly cleanup operations such as scrubbing iown of walls and floors,
etc., can begin. Contaminated liquids and solids could be handled and
treated in some of the ways discussed in the Hazards Summary (ref. 2,
sections 5.2 and 6.2.3). The problem of fission gas cleanup and safe
disposal is perhaps the major problem of the zleanup operation.
2.2.1 Release in the containment tank. - The worst conceivable
problem will be considered, namely, the relea3e of all the fission gases
from a one megawatt experiment which has run _o saturation of all fission
products of significance.
If the release occurs in the containment tank, the reactor would be
shut down, the containment tank ventilation w)uld be shut off, and the
tank would be evacuated. Nothing would be do:he to cleanup the fission
gases until four days had elapsed. This woull permit most of the shorter-
lived gaseous fission products to decay to io_ levels, only the long-
lived iodines and xenons would be significant. At this time, circula-
tion of the containment tank air through filters and through the iodine
removal system would begin. The iodine remow_l system can reduce the
iodine concentration by a factor of about two in twenty-four hours.
After about ten days of recirculating the con;ainment tank air, the io-
dine concentration will have dropped to the p,)int where with reasonably
favorable weather conditions, the air in the ,_ontainment tank could be
discharged up the stack without the 13-week average concentrations in
areas open to the public exceeding the limits specified in reference 3.
149
0
!
At this time contaminated quadrant water would be pumped to hot
storage tanks, the containment tank could be entered after careful sur-
vey, and clean-up could proceed at a rate compatible with permissible
working times.
An estimate of the total reactor downtime, providing no part of
the facility was seriously damaged, would be about 30 days. This length
of time is felt to be quite reasonable in view of the fact that any re-
lease of radioactivity from the experimental container tank would be an
infrequent occurrence and that a release of this magnitude must be viewed
as a rather unusual accident.
2.2.2 Release in the hot lab. - The worst conceivable release of
activity in the hot lab would occur if one of the bottles (discussed
previously in 2.1.5) in which experiment off-gases are stored were to
fail. This failure is not serious, inasmuch as all of these bottles
are contained in a second pressure vessel and the gases are therefore
still contained. At such a time as the fission gases released into
the outer pressure vessel had decayed for four days, they would be cir-
culated through the iodine removal system and discharged up the stack
as soon as weather conditions were favorable. The capacity of the io-
dine removal system is sufficient to accomplish this job in less than
one day. The inner fission gas storage bottles will be sized so that
the 13-week average concentrations in areas open to the public will not
exceed the limits specified in reference 3, in the event of the sequence
of events described above.
The failure of one of these fission gas storage bottles will be a
relatively unusual occurrence and the associated cleanup time of about
5 days maximum, is not unreasonable.
5. QUESTION 3
"If you contemplate releases of radioactive material from the re-
actor building or hot cells in concentrations greater than permissible
under lO CFR, Part 20 of our regulations, it will be necessary for you
to obtain specific approval in your license for such release. Before
we can grant such approval, we will need to evaluate the details of
your proposed procedure to assure that the health and safety of the
public will not be endangered by such release. This we will do later.
At the present stage, an outline of how you would approach this problem
would be helpful."
Releases of radioactive material from the reactor building or hot
cells in concentrations greater than permissible in l0 CFR, Part 20
(ref. 3) during normal or near normal operation are not contemplated.
Releases of radioactive material in concentrations greater than in
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i0 CFR,Part 20 might occur only in the even-; of three relatively improb-
able accidents. These accidents have been d_._scribedabove and their
cleanup discussed. They are:
i. Borax-type runaway which destroys the reactor (discussed in
section i)
2. Combined failure in an experiment of the fuel element, the ex-
periment loop, and the experiment container tank (discussed in
section 2)
5. Failure of one of the gaseous fission product storage bottles
(discussed in section 2)
In all of these cases, the release would be only of gaseous fission
products, and in all cases the allowable AS-week average exposure does
not exceed the limits of i0 CFR, Part 20.
I
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4. QUESTION 4
"With regard to your calculations concealing the effect of the max-
imum credible accident on the containment ves:_el, we would be interested
in the results of your study in which you asslnned the entire energy re-
lease to be focused on the shrapnel shield as a projectile."
4.1 Discussion
In order for all the energy release of tle maximum credible accident
to be focused on the shrapnel shield it is necessary for the top of the
9 foot diameter reactor tank to fail while thc barrel of the tank does
not fail. From figure 2.9 of the Hazards Sunmary (ref. 2) it can be seen
that the top of the reactor tank is about three feet below the face of
the shrapnel shield. The time required, aftex the failure of the reactor
tank top, for the water to reach the face of the shrapnel shield will
vary with the pressure level_ut is of the order of 50 to i00 millisec-
onds for pressure levels of interest in this case. The length of time
required for a rarefaction wave from the reactor barrel to reach the top
of the water is of the order of _ milliseconds. Therefore, if the barrel
of the reactor tank breaks either before or shgrtly after the top of the
reactor tank, the rarefaction waves from the b_rrel will reach the top of
the water column before the water column reaches the shrapnel shield and
these rarefaction waves will stop the water or slow it to such a point
that there will be no appreciable force on the shrapnel shield.
There are only two situations, therefore, in which the shrapnel
shield could feel an appreciable force from the water column. One
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situation is if the pressure levels were extremely high and the time re-
quired for the water to reach the shrapnel shield lower than the 30-100
milliseconds mentioned above. This is just the case in the explosion
considered in the Hazards Summary. There the pressures were high and the
time required for the water column to reach the shrapnel shield is short.
To be completely conservative, it was assumedthat the water reached the
shrapnel shield "instantaneously." The result, as discussed in the Haz-
ards Summary(ref. 2, appendix I), was that the shrapnel shield rose about
15 feet.
The only other way in which the shrapnel shield could feel an ap-
preciable force from the water column would be if the head of the reactor
tank failed, but the barrel did not. This is possible since it is esti-
mated that the reactor tank head would fail at a steady pressure of about
700 psi while the barrel would fail at a steady pressure of about
ii00 psi.
Consider pressure rises in the reactor of various periods.
i. If the period is less than 7 milliseconds, the reactor tank
barrel will actually fail before the head because, being closer to
the reactor, it sees the pressure which existed in the reactor about
i millisecond previously while the reactor tank top sees pressures
which occurred about 4 milliseconds previously.
2. If the period is between 7 and 16 milliseconds, the top will
break first but the barrel will break before the rarefaction wave
from the top can reach the barrel and reduce the pressure. The
rarefaction wave from the barrel will reach the top of the water
column before the water reaches the shrapnel shield.
5. If the period is between 16 and 26 milliseconds, the rare-
faction wave from the tank top reaches the barrel and reduces the
pressure so the barrel breaks at a later time. However, the rare-
faction wave from the barrel still reaches the top of the water
column before the water reaches the shrapnel shield.
Therefore, pressure periods of the order of 50 milliseconds or
longer are required in order for the shrapnel shield to feel any apprec-
iable force in this situation. But every method of analysis considered
in appendix F of the Hazards Summary indicates that the maximum pressure
excursion pressure would not exceed the 700 psi required to fail the
tank head unless the power period were shorter than i0 milliseconds. It
therefore appears that this very slow rate of pressure rise for an
indefinite period could probably not occur because of the self-regulating
features of the reactor and it was for this reason that the subsequent
analysis was not included in the Hazards Summary.
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Suppose it is assumedthat somehowthe pressure did rise very
slowly and that the self-regulating mechanismwas inadequate to shut
downthe reactor and that the reactor tank to]) failed. Four milliseconds
later the rarefaction wave from the tank top would reach the reactor
core and the volume of void in the core would be considerably increased
due to the lowering of the pressure which wo_d increase the volum2 of
voids already present and would flash somewater due to the lowering of
the saturation temperature. At this point the reactor would probably
shut downdue to the self-regulating mechanismand the force of the water
when it struck the shrapnel shield would not l.e very great.
However, if it is assumedthat the reactor does not completely shut
itself off, but continues to operate in the cl_ugging fashion which has
been observed in somereactors, then the formation of steam will drive
the water column into the shrapnel shield like a piston and essentially
all the energy of the excursion will be "focused on the shrapnel shield
as a projectile. " The shrapnel shield would be accelerated upward until
the sides of the shrapnel shield cleared the concrete a sufficient dis-
tance for the pressure inside the reactor tank to be relieved and then
would continue upwards, decelerating until it reached the peak of its
travel.
!
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4.2 Analysis
A computation was carried out of the abo_e course of events. The
equations used were
(Ps - PO)AW- W_
al = M_ (I)
(Ps- (% + Wss]
a2 : % (2)
haw
vs : Ws (3)
where
aI acceleration of the water column before it contacts shrapnel shield
a2 acceleration of the water column after it contacts shrapnel sheild
a s
steam pressure in the core
Po ambient pressure in the containment tank
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Aw cross-sectional area of the water column
W
S
weight of steam generated
M w mass of water column
Wss weight of shrapnel shield
M s mass of shrapnel shield
v s specific volume of steam
h height of rise of water column
The steam pressure Ps and the specific volume vs were related
by assuming the steam to be saturated. The rate of steam generation was
assumed constant at a value representing the average of the "chugs."
A reasonably conservative value for computation purposes seemed to be a
steam generation rate representing a power level of i0 megawatts (refs.
6, 7, and 8). The height at which relief occurred was estimated as fol-
lows. The pressure Ps at which the acceleration a2 would be zero
was determined from equation (2). The steam volume generation rate was
computed at this pressure. The height of the shrapnel shield which would
leave a gap large enough so that the water volume flow from the tank at
this pressure would be equal to the steam volume generation rate was
taken to be the height of complete relief. Equations (i), (2), and (3)
were integrated numerically up to the height of complete relief. No re-
lief was considered up to this point, a conservative assumption. For the
remainder of its rise, the shrapnel shield was assumed to be only under
the influence of gravity.
The height of rise of the shrapnel shield calculated by this method
was 1.8 feet and the total energy generated in the chugging portion of
the excursion up to the time the "height of complete relief" of the shrap-
nel shield was attained was about 25 megawatt seconds. To get some idea
of the sensitivity of these results to the average power level assumed in
the chugging phase (i0 megawatts), a similar computation was carried out
assuming an average power level of 20 megawatts. The corresponding val-
ues were found to be 2.5 feet rise and 27 megawatt seconds of energy in
the chugging phase. Therefore, the results are not particularly sensi-
tive to the assumed average power level. The height of rise is, in both
cases, considerably less than the height of rise calculated in the Hazards
Summary for the equivalent TNT explosion which was about 15 feet. The
foregoing analysis is crude but the height of rise computed is sufficiently
low that refined analysis is unwarranted.
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5. QUESTION5
"Your calculations of the effect of the naximumcredible accident
assumedthat the energy release takes place at the rate of a TNTexplo-
sion. If such a study is at all feasible, we would be interested in
similar calculations in which the energy release is equated to someex-
plosive which burns slower than TNT."
In our calculations of the effect of the maximumcredible accident,
it was assumedthat the energy release takes l lace at the rate of a TNT
explosion because it was felt that the destructive effects would be
greater than if a slower release rate were assumed. This was felt to be
the case because of several reasons of which the following two are perhaps
most significant.
i
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i. A slower release of the energy would z esult in lower pressure
levels and possibly longer durations. In man_ cases, the duration of
the force is determined, not by the duration cf the primary pressure
wave, but rather by the time at which a rarefsction wave relieves the
primarypressure wave. A typical example is the force on the 70 feet
diameter shielding pool wall. The force on t_ is wall would be greatly
relieved when a rarefaction wave from the pool surface reaches the wall
a short time later. This time interval is independent of the pressure
level (ref. 2, appendix H). Thus, for situatiDns of this type, a slower
release of energy would result in lower pressuce levels, but not in
significantly longer durations and the fast energy release would be more
destructive.
2. At the lower pressure levels of the s]ower energy release, the
material may be able to resist the forces. A typical example of this
is in the shielding pool floor. At distances from the reactor center-
line of 25 feet or more_ the peak pressures or the floor due to the
equivalent TNT explosion are estimated as 600( to i0,000 psi (ref. 2,
fig. H.I). The dynamic crushing strength of concrete is between 5000
and 6000 psi (ref. 9) and therefore any appreciable reduction in pressure
levels would result in the concrete not being crushed. Thus_ for situa-
tions of this type, the fast energy release would be more destructive.
The recent model tests conducted by the lallistics Research Labora-
tories of the Aberdeen Proving Grounds for the Wright Air Development
Center (ref. i0) strongly substantiate our fesling that the fast energy
release of a TNT explosion is more destructive than the slow energy re-
lease of a propellant. Ten charges of different sizes were exploded in
a quarter scale model of the proposed WADC Nuclear Engineering Test
Reactor. Six of these charges were explosive_, four were propellants.
The results indicated that the explosives did considerably more damage.
A direct quote from reference I0 best describes the comparison.
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"Comparison of the results from propellant and explosive show the strong
dependence of damage on rate of energy release. Round 5, with a full-
scale equivalent energy of 278 megawatt-seconds released relatively
slowly by burning a propellant, produced about equivalent damage to
Rounds 4 or S, which rapidly released a full-scale energy equivalent of
21.5 megawatt-seconds by detonating an explosive."
In view of the qualitative theoretical discussion, the results of
these model tests, and the length of the computations necessary to eval-
uate the effect of a slower rate of energy release, it does not seem
worthwhile to carry out the computations.
An interesting point relative to the model tests, though not con-
cerned with this particular question, is the fact that the measured pres-
sures in those sections of the WADC reactor which resemble the NACA re-
actor are less than those calculated either by WADC or by methods similar
to that used in appendix H of reference 2. This is a further indication
that the pressure-time histories which were assumed in the analysis of
the Hazards Summary were conservative, as they were intended to be.
6. QUESTION 6
"We are also interested in whether you have considered_ in the
course of your hazards analysis, the possibility that the cadmium con-
trol sheets might melt and thus be removed as an effective control."
The Hazards Summary is not clear on this point, but it has never
been intended that bare cadmium control sheets would be used. The cad-
mium will be clad or canned in a material whose melting point is at
least as high as that of aluminum in such a manner that even though the
cadmium should melt it would still be held in place by the cladding or
can.
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Figure 4. - Air lock and air lock seal details.
161
DIFE. PRESSURE
REL4EF_ VALVE i
"_L__
CONTAINMENT TANK, A BLDNG.
/
Figure 5. - Air lock pressure system.
162
I
p_
O.
163
0
!
0
i
0
V. LEAKAGE RATES FROM THE CONTAINMENT TANK OF
THE NACA REACTOR FACILITY
June i0, 1957
In supplement IV to the Reactor Hazards report, an allowable leakage
rate from the containment tank of the NACA Reactor Facility was determined
which would insure that, in the event of a maximum credible accident,
the average, thirteen-week concentration at the nearest point open to the
public would not exceed the limits specified in Federal Register, Part
20, Title i0, CFR for areas where people regularly reside. This allowable
leakage rate was 15 cubic feet/day. The design and testing of the con-
tainment tank to maintain this leakage rate was discussed.
The NACA believes that this leakage rate can be maintained by the
methods described in supplement IV, and all the design details and test-
ing procedures described therein will be carried out with this aim. It
is true, however, that there was perhaps an undue amount of conservatism
in the assumptions that were used in arriving at the allowable leakage
rate.
It is the purpose of this memorandum to discuss those assumptions
which were felt to be too conservative and to arrive at a more realistic
leakage rate, but one which would still insure that the average, thirteen-
week concentration did not exceed the limits specified in the Federal
Register. Testing procedures apropos to this leakage rate will also be
discussed.
i. Allowable Leakage Rate
Four assumptions made in computing the allowable leakage rate will
be discussed, as follows:
(a) The fission product inventory in the reactor
(b) The amount of radioactive iodine in the air of the containment
tank after the accident
(c) The height of release of the fission products
(d) The equilibrium pressure after the accident
i.i Fission product inventory. - The assumption was made (Supplement
IV, section 1.1.2) that the inventory of fission products in the reactor
was that which corresponded to a reactor operating continuously at 60
megawatts for a period long enough to saturate all the gaseous fission
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products of significance. The operating cycle of the reactor is such,
however, tilt the average power over the tell day operating period is
40-50 megawatts with a power of 60 megawatt_,occurring only for a short
period at the end of the cycle_ Therefore, for this leakage rate esti-
mate, it will be assumedthat the fission product inventory in the re-
actor is that which corresponds to a reactor operating continuously at
50 megawatts for a period long enoughto saturate all the gaseous fis-
sion products of consequence.
1.2 Iodine release. - The assumption w_s made (Supplement IV, sec-
tion 1.1.2) that all the radioactive iodine was distributed in the air
of the containment tank. The reactor is located in a nine foot diameter
tank with twenty feet of water over the core. This reactor tank is in
the center of a seventy foot diameter_ twenty five foot high water pool.
Therefore, in the maximum credible accident_ the nuclear excursion and
the metal-water reaction occur primarily underwater. It would be reas-
onable to expect that a good deal of the radioactive iodine would be re-
leased in intimate contact with water, lodine is quite water soluble;
indeed, all of the radioactive iodine in the fission product inventory
(about 14 gms) could be dissolved in about 1.5 cubic feet of water at
room temperature_ and the solubility increases with water temperature.
It seems reasonable to assume that a large fraction of the radioactive
iodine will remain in solution and not be p_esent in the air of the con-
tainment tank. Therefore, it will be assumed that 25 percent of the ra-
dioactive iodine would be distributed in the air of the containment tank.
1.3 Height of release. - The assumption was made (Supplement IV,
section 1.1.3) that the fission products would be leaking out of the con-
tainment tank at ground level. For the first 27 feet above grade_ the
containment tank is surrounded by the main reactor building (ref. i, fig.
2.13). Any radioactive fission products issuing from the containment
tank below the 27 foot level would be mixed in the air of the reactor
building and blown out the reactor building ventilating system. The ex-
hausts of the reactor ventilating system are a minimum of 30 feet above
grade. Therefore_ it will be assumed that t_e height of release of the
fission products is 27 feet.
1.4 Equilibrium pressure. - The assumption was made in estimating
the equilibrium pressure after the accident_ that all the energy of the
nuclear excursion_ the metal-water reaction_ and the hydrogen-air explo-
sion went into increasing the temperature an_ humidity of the air
(ref. I, appendix H). It was also assumed tl_at all the hydrogen gener-
ated by the metal-water reaction would combine with air. The nuclear ex-
cursion and the metal-water reaction both occur underwater and most of
their energy will go to heating water. If t_e energy in the nuclear ex-
cursion and metal-water reaction were assumel to be distributed between
the water and the air in the containment tan_ so as to produce an equal
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rise in temperature, less than one percent of the energy would go into
the air. A reasonably conservative estimate of the portion of the energy
of the nuclear excursion and the metal-water reaction which would go into
the air might be about ten percent and this assumption is made here. The
assumption that all the hydrogen produced reacts is also too conservative.
In the maximum credible accident, the greatest part of the hydrogen will
be produced underwater and will be hurled into the air of the containment
tank by the violence of the explosion. In order for it to react with air
it would have to form a flammable mixture and there would have to be an
ignition source present. Further, the equilibrium concentration is below
the combustion limit by a factor of four (ref. i, appendix G). There-
fore, it does not seem likely that most or all of the hydrogen would
react with air. It will be assumed that one-third of the hydrogen gen-
erated reacts with air and that all of this energy goes into the air.
The equilibrium pressure after the accident computed by the use of these
assumptions is about 0.5 psi as compared to the 1.9 psi computed in the
Hazards Summary (ref. i, appendix H).
1.5 Leakage rate. - The effect of the change in these four assump-
tions on the allowable leakage rate was computed_ keeping all other assump-
tions identical to those used in Supplement IV. The allowable leakage
rate is 115 cubic feet/day at an overpressure of 0.5 psi.
2. Leakage Rate Test Procedures
All the testing procedures described in Supplement IV will be per-
formed as described. However_ with the new leakage rate of 115 cubic
feet/day at an overpressure of 0.3 psi it is possible to make an addi-
tional test which was not possible previously, that is an accelerated
overpressure test. Since the containment tank is designed to withstand
an internal overpressure of 5 psi with a safety factor of three, a leak-
age rate test could be run at an overpressure of 4 psi instead of the 0.3
psi overpressure expected as the result of the maximum credible accident.
At the low flow rates being considered, the leaks would be small in size
and the flow through them would be laminar. In laminar flow, the volu-
metric flow is directly proportional to the pressure difference. An over-
pressure of 4 psi would produce about 13 times the leakage rate which
would occur at an overpressure of _.5 psi. It is therefore possible to
produce in one day of accelerated testing, the leakage which would occur
in 13 days of testing at the expected overpressure. Therefore_ in the
accelerated test the leakage rate which one is called upon to detect
would be about 1500 cubic feet/day.
The accelerated overpressure test would be conducted in the follow-
ing manner. Resistance thermometers or thermopile junctions would be
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placed at various locations in the air of the containment tank. These
instruments would be of sufficient numberand accuracy so that the aver-
age air temperature inside the containment tank could be determined to
an accuracy of at least I ° F.
The containment tank would be pressurized to 4 psig and then closed
off in precisely the manner it would be in the event of an accident. The
reduction in pressure would be measuredafter a 24 to 48 hour period and
corrected for air temperature variation. A leakage of 1500 cubic feet/day
would result in a corrected pressure drop of about 2.8 inches of water in
as hours. The uncertainty in pressure drop due to an uncertainty of i ° F
in air temperature is about 0.8 inches of water. Accordingly, an exces-
sive leakage rate could readily be determined after 48 hours. If the
average air temperature were accurate to 1/2 ¢ F, this length of time
could be cut to 2A hours. As part of the initial testing prior to the
reactor going into service a series of tests of this type will be con-
ducted. The numberof temperature sensing devices in the air of the
containment tank will be varied to determine the numberrequired to give
the desired accuracy of measurementof air temperature. This type of
test would then be run periodically during the life of the reactor.
If an excessive leakage rate was detectel, the source of the leak
would be located by helium leak detector test3 and repaired. The reactor
would, of course, not be permitted to operate until the leakage rate had
been brought downto permissible values.
3. Containment Tank Air Conlitioning
An additional safety feature of the NACAReactor Facility which has
not been discussed previously is the containmmt tank air conditioning.
The containment tank is air conditioned durin_ normal reactor operation.
There are four units which provide a total co._ling capacity of 27 tons;
their location may be seen in figure 2.1_(b) _f the Hazards Summary(ref.
I). The units are connected in pairs to two _eparate electric circuits.
Therefore_ in the event of the accident_ it i_ unlikely that any more than
two of these units would be inoperable. The _Lir conditioners surviving
the accident would continue to run and would _fter a time reduce the
overpressure in the containment tank to the o:'der of a few inches of
water. The length of time requiredoto do thi_ would vary with such fac-
tors as the roof heating load, the number of _its which survive the
accident, etc., but even assumingunfavorable circumstances, the over-
pressure in the containment tank would be red_Lcedto a few inches of
water within 24 hours.
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4. Sumn_ry
The contents of this supplement can be summarizedas follows:
I. All design details and testing procedures described in Supplement
IV will be carried out with the aim of maintaining a leakage rate below
IS cubic feet/day.
2. If someof the conservative assumptions in the previous analyses
are changedto more realistic ones, an allowable leakage rate of i15
cubic feet/day would not exceed the limits for thirteen-week average con-
centration specified in the Federal Register for areas where people reg-
ularly reside. The equilibrium pressure after the maximumcredible acci-
dent would be 0.5 psi.
5. An accelerated leakage rate test with the containment tank pres-
surized to 4 psi would require the detection of leakage rates of about
1500 cubic feet/day. This type of test can be conducted in 2A to 48
hours with suitable instrumentation for the determination of containment
tank air temperature. Such tests will be run periodically throughout
the life of the reactor.
4. An additional safety feature of the NACAReactor Facility is the
containment tank air conditioning which, even in unfavorable circumstances,
would reduce the overpressume in the tank to a few inches of water within
24 hours.
i. Lewis Research Center:
NASAMEMO
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VI. ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS
RAISED BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
February S_ 1958
In order to clarify certain points relative to the safety of the
proposed NACA Reactor Facility_ the Atomic Energy Commission, in a letter
(ref. i) has requested written answers to a number of miscellaneous
questions. This supplement to the NACA Reactor Facility Hazards Summary
(ref. 2) consists of the answers to the ten questions of the AEC letter.
In addition to these ten answers_ this supplement contains answers to
other questions raised by the AEC subsequent to the original questions.
i. QUESTION i
"Estimates at this time of the quantity and nuclear characteristics
of both 'cold' and 'hot' wastes."
The radioactive wastes from the reactor area are generally classi-
fied as liquid; solid_ or gaseous wastes. An estimate of the quantity
and the activity of these wastes along with information concerning the
process handling is given in the following sections.
I.i Liquids
i.i.i Process system. - Contaminated water from the primary cooling
water system will make up the largest volume of the liquid wastes. The
operation of this system is discussed in section 2.1.12 of the Hazards
Summary (ref. 2) and the radioactive waste disposal system has been out-
lined in section 5.2. Table i.i indicates an estimate of the quantity
and the activity of the waste water from the primary system and the hot
laboratory.
The volume of contaminated water to the hot retention tanks on a
continuous basis is estimated at i_.65 gpm with an average activity during
normal operation of 103 d/cm3sec or 0.03 _c/cc. The volume of contaminated
water on an intermediate basis will be between 12_000 and 36,000 gallons
per operation cycle, with an average activity during normal operation of
103 d/cm3sec.
The hot waste waters indicated in table i.i will be retained in
separate 125;000 gallon tanks as follows:
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Tank
A
B
C
D
Waste source Initial activity, Type usage
_c/cc
IntermittentReactor loop
Reactor sump
Hot lab sump
Pumpand fan sump
0.05
.03
.02
•19
Continuous
Intermittent and
continuous
Intermittent and
continuous
!
O
(Recent design information indicates that eight to ten 25,000 gallon
tanks will give better flexibility for over-all hot water retention and
waste transfer systems.)
If a fuel element leaks fission products into the primary water
system_ a continuously operating fission prodlct monitoring unit in the
line will detect the radioactive iodine from the leak and warn the reactor
operator as described in section 2.5.14 of the Hazards Summary (ref. 2).
The triggering limit of iodine 151 in the anion chamber of the
fission product monitoring unit is estimated to be 1.5x10-4 _c/cc or less
depending on the purity of the primary water. This activity would be
dispersed in the primary water such that the total activity due to fis-
sion products could be estimated at
1.3xlO -4 pc/cc (9._6xi07 cc)
= 4.4xi05 _c
0.028_ ratio 1151 activity to total
at a maximum concentration
= 5xi0-5 _c/cc
The bypass demineralizers (mixed bed and _ation) will be capable of
removing an estimated 99.5 percent of the actiCe ions in the primary water
system in case of a fission product leak. Thi3 will be accomplished by
recycling the water through the beds on a once through basis with the
reactor and the primary cooling water pumps sh_t down. Dumping to re-
tention tanks will allow additional cleanup thzough the waste disposal
demineralizers in the Fan House, and will give an estimated total decon-
tamination factor of 2xlO 5. After treatment, 5he radioactivity of the
waste is estimated to be a maximum of 2.S2xlO -5 _c/cc and after being
sampled to determine the concentration and nat lre of the activity, the
waste will be stored or diluted to maximum permissible concentrations for
area liquid effluents.
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Shielding water in the quadrants and canal areas will have a con-
tinuous purge of 50 to i00 gpm for each divided area. This purge water
will pass through a demineralizer mixed bed unit and return to the system,
or be pumped to the i_0003000 gallon storage tank. Table 1.2 indicates
an estimate of the quantity and activity of cold and intermediate wastes
from the process water system. The piping system for the quadrant and
canal water is so arranged that the purge water may be sent to the hot
retention tanks in the event that leakage from experiments or thimbles
raise the water activity above 10 -3 _c/cc, and fresh makeup water will
replace the removal.
All waste water from the quadrant and canal areas or the storage
tank will be cycled through the demineralizer until the concentration
and nature of the activity indicates that it may be diluted to maximum
permissible levels for area liquid effluents.
1.1.2 Experimental systems. Experiments that require water modera-
tion or internal water flow systems that may become contaminated radio-
actively or materially will be required to have separate cleanup systems
to operate such that the water activity to the waste retention tanks will
be about 0.03 _e/cc.
1.2 Solids
1.2.1 Waste resins. - Spent resin from the primary water bypass loop
demineralizer will be flushed from the demineralizer tank and discharged
into an underground pit. The flushing operation will be completely remote
by operating discharge valves and flush water valves from behind the room
shield area. The resins will be allowed to settle and the liquid phase
will drain to the pump house sump. Off gases from both units will be
drawn to the stack gas system.
The resin pit will hold 480 cubic feet of resin with an initial
estimated average activity of 0.3 _c/ec. Remote means will be used to
transfer the resin into shielded or concrete mix shipping containers for
transportation to a burial area such as Oak Ridge, when the activity has
cooled sufficiently to be transported. The resin pit will have 38 inches
of concrete plus the required earth shielding to place the surface activity
at a value less than tolerance. A stainless steel lining inside the con-
crete pit will form a leakproof container for the liquid and the resins.
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An overflow line to the sump and a liquid level indicating rod ensure
containment of the slurry during discharge operations.
A similar system of resin transfer and burial will be used for the
two demineralizers in the waste cleanup system if the residual activity
of the resins exceeds 5x10-5 _c/cc.
1.2.2 Waste metals and debris. - Waste metal, machining scrap, and
specimen samples as well as secondary scrap from the hot' laboratory and
other hot work areas, will be handled in the manner described in section
5.2.4 of the Hazards Summary (ref. 2). Some of this material will be
stored in the dry storage area of the hot l_boratory to await off-site
disposal, and most of the rest will be bale@ or packaged for burial at an
off-site location such as Oak Ridge. The combustible wastes which indicate
extremely low activity (background conditiozs) and originate in uncontam-
inated areas, such as the Office Building or the Service Equipment Building,
may be incinerated on the site.
1.3 Gases
1.5.i Process system off gas. - The demineralized water to the primary
cooling water system will be completely degassed in the Service Equipment
Building prior to entering the reactor water system. With the high purity
requirements of this water_ maintained by th_ bypass demineralizers, it is
estimated that little or no water decompositLon products will be generated
in the system to the point where continuous legassing will be required. It
is expected that the few milliliters per day of these gases, dissolved in
the water, can be removed by the demineraliz_rs and their formation con-
trolled by pH stabilization.
Radioactive off gases, which result fron fuel element leakage of
gaseous fission products, will be removed at the reactor pressure tank
through a normally closed bleed valve. Thes,_ gases, as well as gases
formed from decomposition of the water, will be monitored and stored, or
diluted and released in the effluent stack gas system in accordance with
allowable concentrations for the stack. The estimated activity of these
gases will be 0.02 _c/cc when bled from the 1.rocess system and the esti-
mated volume will be O.IS cubic foot per operational cycle at S.T.P.
conditions.
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Other process system off gases will feed into the i0,000 cfm venting
system described as the basement area fan in section 2.1.14.2 of the Haz-
ards Summary (ref. 2). This vent system operates from the basement of the
Reactor Building through the Utility Tunnel under the Hot Laboratory to
the Fan House. Vent gases from the Reactor Sump and the Hot Laboratory
Sump and Treatment Tank are collected into this system in the Utility
Tunnel area. The activity of this ventilating system is expected to be
negligible in the basement area but may rise to 10 -13 _c/cc downstream
in the Utility Tunnel. The sumps can be emptied and purged in the case
that access to the Utility Tunnel is required and only then under Health
Physics supervision.
Vent gases from the Pump House Building, Sump and Resin Pit are con-
nected to an individual 500 cfm vent system in the Fan House. Under nor-
mal operation, the activit_ of this air is estimated to be negligible but
may rise to a value of i0 -_2 _c/cc after a fuel element leak has been
experienced. This system will operate at a negative pressure of 4 to 6
inches of water.
1.5.2 Fission gases out of experiments. - Fission gases accidentally
released from experimental loops will accumulate in the experiment con-
tainer tank (section 2.1.1 of Supplement IV). As was pointed out in
Supplement IV_ such gaseous fission products would be purged from the con-
tainer and bottled at 250 psi in i0 to 50 cubic foot tanks of small diam-
eter. This operation would be carried out in the hot handling section of
the Hot Laboratory. These storage tanks would in turn be enclosed in a
safety tank to afford double containment. The safety tank would also
house the vacuum pumps, blowers_ and compressors necessary for the off
gas system.
The operation by which fuel bearing elements would be dissected into
specimens will be carried out in a hood within cell number 2. Such hoods
would be made as leakproof as possible, and a pressure differential main-
tained between hood and cell sufficiently high to ensure a 150 foot per
minute velocity through unavoidable holes. Hood effluent will be filtered_
compressed_ and stored in the same manner outlined above for gaseous fis-
sion products from the container.
An iodine removal system will be installed through which stored air
will be passed after an adequate storage time in the tanks. The required
storage time will depend on the efficiencies attainable in the iodine
removal system. Efficiencies of 99.9 percent have been reported on three
different types of iodine removal equipment, silver nitrate coated packed
towers, caustic bubble cap scrubbers, and synthetic zeolite adsorption beds.
We are presently preparing tests on models of the latter to determine
performance.
Initially installed storage capacity and iodine removal equipment will
be sized to accommodate expected experiment operation, conservatively
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estimated volumes of air involved and required storage time. Additional
units can be fairly readily added if the nee.I for them becomesapparent.
Experiment operation would, of course, be li_ted to the off gas facilities
available to handle gaseous fission products.
Present estimates are that approximately 120 cubic feet of tank stor-
age would be required for each 1 MWexperiment requiring purging of the
experiment container. Of this, 20 cubic feet would be required for a
double purge3 the remainder would allow approximately L5 hours of dissect-
ing time in the hood. Hood leakage is esti_ted at 2 cfm based on the
Berkely experience of 0.02 cfm combined leakage and off gas in a 5 cubic
foot glove box (ref. 5). Present plans call for the initial installation
of approximately 500 cubic feet of compressed off gas storage capacity.
There is space available for the installation of S times that amount if
required.
Release of stored gases will be regulated so that concentrations per-
mitted under i0 CFR, part 20 of Federal Register will not be exceeded.
Factors affecting this release will be:
(a) Activity of effluent from iodine remgver
(b) Storage time
(c) Normal ventilating air available for dilution
(d) Meteorological conditions.
!
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2. QUESTION 2
"The criteria for determining the treatm_mt capacity of proposed
processing equipment, such as demineralizers, evaporators, and filters."
2.1 Primary Water Bypass DemJ neralizer
The mixed bed and the cation demineraliz_rs, described in sections
2.1.12.1 and 5.2.1.3 of the Hazards Summary (_ef. 2) will operate on 100
gpm of the primary water system. On the basi_ of the information in
appendix E, the demineralizing system must maintain a water concentration
in the primary water loop as given on page 17_ (ref. 2) and have maximum
total ion concentration of O.1 ppm CaCO 5 equivalent. This system will
require a cleanup capacity as calculated on the following page.
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Na
K
Ca
Mg
SiO 2
Cl
Stainless
A1
Be
- O.OS
- 0.005
- O. 005
- 0.002
- 0.02
- O.O6
- 0.i0
- 0.07
- 0.002
ppm
- 0.0654 ppm as CaCO 5
- 0.0064
- 0.0125
- 0.0082
- 0.0554
- 0.0846
- 0.2690
- 0.5892
- 0.0222
Input
Output
Difference
= 0.8909 ppm as CaCO 5
O.lO
= 0.7909 ppm as CaCO 3
= 0.0461 grains/gal as CaCO 5
Bed capacity requirement for 1/2 year operation at lO0 gpm
0.0461(i00) (60) (540 hr/cycle) (12 cycles) = 1.2xlO 6 grains
One mixed bed exchanger and one cation exchanger with a total of 120
cubic feet of resin will have a combined capacity of 4.8x106 grains.
It is expected that the mixed bed and cation demineralizers will be
capable of reducing the ion concentration to a value lower than the set
effluent value of 0.1 ppm as CaC03. This value was chosen as a compromise
to ensure that the resulting pH of the water would be about 6.6 to 6.8,
an optimum for the lowest aluminum corrosion rate. If the cleanup effi-
ciency of the designed demineralizers turns out to be more like 99.5 per-
cent, as is indicated by industrial demineralizer manufacturers, the two
units can be operated at a reduced flow rate.
In the case that fission products from a fuel element leak enter the
primary water system 3 the demineralizers, operating at full flow rate for
a period of 20 to 60 hours, will be capable of reducing the total ion con-
centration to less than 4xlO -5 ppm and the total activity to less than
2.5xi0 -3 _c/cc.
2.2 Waste Disposal and Quadrant-Canal Water Cleanup Demineralizers
The demineralizers for waste disposal system and the quadrant and
canal water cleanup system are mixed bed units with a maximum combined
flow rate of 400 gpm. For the most part, these units will be operating on
low ion concentration waste waters or recycle waters with activities un-
suitable for direct disposal or re-entry into the system. These units will
be of a design capacity and construction similar to the bypass deminerallzer
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mixed bed unit. Regeneration liquids, after neutralization, will be
further concentrated, stored or diluted for plant liquid effluent in
accordance with i0 CFR, part 20 of Federal Register. Information on the
efficiency for removal of radioactive contaminants from liquids of this
type and on a volume scale of this size is not available. However, lab-
oratory scale studies indicate that long-lived active nuclides such as
cesium-157, strontium-89, cerium-144, cobalt-60, and zirconium-95 can be
removed from solutions containing 10 -6 ppm or less in the presence of in-
active ions such as calcium with a concentration of 107 times greater.
Indications also show that some trivalent ions such as cerium 144 can re-
place inactive calcium ions even after breakthrough or bed exhaustion
conditions exist (ref. 4). For quadrant and the canal water, as an in-
fluent, it is estimated that decontamination factors of 20 (at 400 gpm)
to i000 (at 80 gpm) may be realized for the demineralizers.
!
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2.3 Waste Disposal Evaporator
The evaporator discussed in section 5.2.5 (ref. 2) will not be in-
stalled in the initial operation. At this time, it is estimated that its
purpose as a high activity material concentrator can be accomplished by
the waste disposal demineralizer. If, however, the volume of waste liquid
from the demineralizers and the hot laboratory sump concentrate becomes a
hot storage problem, a i0 gallon per hour evaporator or a flash dryer
will be added.
2.4 Air Filters
There are two types of air filters which will be used on the ventila-
tion and off-gas systems of this installation. They are the standard
roughing filter and the absolute filter.
No estimate has been made on the amount of airborne particulate ma-
terial that could be expected in normal operati(,n of the reactor system.
Rather then, individual air velocities and air (_hanges were set on the
individual rooms and areas based on existing sy_;tems in good operation
such as ANL, 0RNL, and MTR. Modifications were made where the existing
operation has had difficulties in the spread of airborne contamination.
Area
Hot Laboratory Cells
Hot Laboratory - Decontamination Area
Reactor Containment Tank
Pump House Building
Chang_ s/hr
6O
5.5 - 4.5
.055
1.5 - 2.0
In velocity
through opening 3
ft/min
LS0
i0 - 40
Limited access
Limited access
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All of the Hot Laboratory cells will have roughing filters on the
inlet and exit side of the venting system. All independent laboratory
hoods will have roughing and absolute filters.
The four i0,000 cfm lines to the stack will have absolute filters
of 99.9 percent efficiency and roughing filters on the upstream side. An
additional 1000 cfm system for the PumpHouse and the off-gas system will
have a similar system.
The roughing filters and the absolute filters will be canned in drums
for off-site disposal whenthey becomeclogged, contaminated, or indicate
leakage.
3. QUESTION 3
"An evaluation of the possibility of leaks in the liquid waste dis-
posal system. If any such leak is credible, an evaluation of the con-
sequencies of such a leak."
Two types of tank and plumbing installations are proposed for the
liquid waste disposal system. Both types are designed as absolute con-
tainment systems for neutralized liquid wastes. Both types will have
level indicators, vents, cooling water lines if required, and plumbing
for inlets and outlets.
3.i Type i
This type construction will be composed of tanks and plumbing in a
double wall of steel. The inner steel tank will hold the waste liquid
and the outer steel tank will act as a barrier against the possibility
of waste liquids leaking out of the containing area. This open area be-
tween the inner and outer steel tanks will have a low spot sump which
will be monitored for water, either as ground water seeping in through
outer steel surface or waste liquids leaking in through cracks, seam
breaks, and so forth in the inner surface. After an indication of water
in this drain sump, a liquid sample may be taken to determine which sur-
face is leaking, and, after emptying the retention tank, repairs can be
made. In the case of uncontrollable leakage from the inner tank, the
liquid can be pumped immediately to another retention tank.
3.2 Type 2
This type construction will be composed of steel tanks and plumbing
within a reinforced concrete structure. Between the tank base and the
concrete basepad, there will be a secondary barrier in the form of a steel
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dish. The size of this dish will be such as to extend beyond the vertical
walls of the retention tank but inside the concrete structure, thereby
collecting any waste liquid leakage. This dish will have a collection
sump, an alarm indicator, and a sumppump.
The concrete structure will be waterproofed on the outside surface.
Inside, on the basepad there will be a drainage collection sump, an alarm
indicator, and a sumppump. Groundwater which may seep through the con-
crete structure will be pumpedout, monitored, and discarded. In the
event that there is water in the dish, an increase in the ground water
collection or activity in the ground water collection, the individual
tank will be drained and the leak repaired.
!
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5.5 Waste Liquid Transfer Pump Area
The waste disposal retention tanks will Lave interconnecting piping
and a series of pumps and valves which will b_ housed in a steel-lined
concrete drain pit. Leakage from the pipe, pump housing, or packing seals
will be collected and pumped or drained into one of the waste disposal
tanks.
4. QUESTION 4
"Basis for believing that NACA can attaiIL the leakage rate specified
for the containment vessel. In this regard, _CA has orally provided
information as to their own experience with wJ nd tunnels. However, this
information does not appear in the record on _hich the Commission must
act. There should be an indication of the validity of NACA's experience
with wind tunnels in terms of the proposed te_t reactor, considering such
matters as the number of penetrations, size, _md accessibility of the
various parts of the sphere for testing leakage rates."
4.1 Basis for Believing that NACA Can _ttain the Leakage
Rate Specified for the Contairment Vessel
The allowable leakage rate from the containment tank is 1500 cubic
feet per day at an overpressure of 4 pounds p_r square inch as described
in section 2 of Supplement V. The total air volume in the containment
tank is about 451,000 cubic feet. The leakage rate is, therefore, about
1/3 percent per day at 4 pounds per square inch overpressure.
Leakage rate tests on the containment ta_k of the Experimental Boiling
Water Reactor are reported in ANL 5607. The final leakage rate test con-
ducted after all construction was completed and the plant ready to operate
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gave a leakage rate of 450 cubic feet per day at an overpressure of L5
pounds per square inch. The total air volume in the containment tank of
the EBWR is about 500,000 cubic feet. The test leakage rate is, there-
fore, about 0.09 percent per day at an overpressure of 15 pounds per
square inch.
The NACA containment tank is about the same size as the EBWR con-
tainment tank. The allowable leakage rate of the NACA containment tank
is over 3.5 times the measured leakage rate of the EBWR containment tank,
and this allowable leakage rate is at an overpressure of less than one-
third the overpressure of the EBWR tests.
On this basis, it is felt that the leakage rate specified for the
NACA containment tank can be achieved.
4.2 NACA Experience with Wind Tunnels
Although the supersonic wind tunnel is a large welded vessel, it
differs from the containment vessel in that it is a dynamic rather than a
static air containment device. The problem to be handled in the wind
tunnel is not that of containing the air within it, but preventing the
contamination of such air with the moisture laden atmospheric air from
without. The i0 by i0 Foot Supersonic Wind Tunnel, at its lowest pres-
sure condition, contains about one-half pint of water vapor in a tunnel
volume of approximately 675,000 cubic feet. This is equivalent to a
specific humidity of 80 parts per million.
There are many places where outside (wet) air might leak in large
quantity. The main ones are the compressor shaft seals, the flexible
wall and second throat seals, the disc of the fifteen foot butterfly
valve, and the peripheral seal of the twenty-four foot diameter swinging
gate valve. Some of these are impossible to seal completely, and a system
of buffer air has been provided so that any leaks into the tunnel will be
the buffer or dry air. The compressor seals use the most air in this
system because the compressor end play is large. The flexible wall and
second throat seals have an aggregate length exceeding five hundred and
fifty feet. These are sliding seals with a buffer air system. The
twenty-four foot swinging gate valve has an inflatable seal. A buffer
system was supplied here as well, but is not used. The buffer air
system might have been replaced by a vacuum system such as is to be pro-
vided for the penetration seals of the reactor containment vessel, but a
pressure air system using dry air was easier to handle for this specific
problem.
There are many other penetrations in the tunnel that were sealed;
each in a way adapted to the specific design problem, that is, the tunnel
bottom door (over 30 ft long and l0 ft wide) used "0" ring type pressure
seal.
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The tunnel sealing problem is not specifically applicable to the
reactor containment tank sealing problems, but the techniques and the
degree of care are the same. A leak of wet air (lO0 plus grains per
pound) can invalidate a test through the effects of a condensation shock.
Under conditions of aerodynamic testing (the tunnel operating on a re-
circulating basis) the entire vessel is pumpedto very low pressures.
The test section simulated altitude can be higher than lO0,O00 feet.
During this type of operation_ the highest total pressure in the vessel
is less than three inches of mercury absolute.
5. QUESTION5
"Basis for believing that NACAcan maintain the leakage rate spec-
ified. In particular, we would like you to direct your attention to the
following matters that do not appear to be covered in your application."
5.i Question 5(al
"The existence of plugs or unused hole_ in the walls of the container
and the system to be used for measuring the leak rate at these
penetrations."
The unusedpenetrations, whether for electrical cables or piping
connections, will be connected to the vacuumsystem shownin figure 1 of
Supplement IV and also shownin figure 1 of this supplement. Unused
electrical penetrations will have pipe plugs instead of sealant plug
adapters. Unusedpipe or other such penetrations will have the vacuum
system connection in the pipe cap or plug or blind flange. In addition,
a flow measuring system will be supplied in the line (s) from the pene-
trations to the vacuumtank. This will provide a faster response to any
leaks. Other flow measuring points will be provided to aid in localizing
the area of any leaks.
5.2 Question 5(b)
"Howwill the spring-loaded solenoid valves in the ventilation system
be madeleak tight? What kind of valves are these (i.e., butterfly or
gate)?"
The spring-loaded solenoid valves will oe of the globe or poppet type
held open against the spring (closing) pressure by air pressure on a dia-
phragm. The valves will be Clayton or Annin valves. The air pressure
will in turn be controlled by a solenoid pilot valve designed to release
the air holding pressure upon electrical power cut-off. The valve will
be placed in the line so that a positive pressure in the containment vessel
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will tend to close the valve more tightly. Two such valves will be in
series with a check valve and a hand operated valve in the inlet line as
well as the outlet line. The containment tank test will include the
solenoid valves as part of the test. Valves of this type have been used
in very many places throughout this laboratory in widely varying applica-
tions. They have been found to be tight sealing under vacuum conditions
as low as forty microns.
5.3 Question 5(c)
"Can the reactor be operated with the truck access door open?"
The truck door must be in the full closed position and the seal
vacuum within normal limits in order to permit reactor startup. Moving
the main reactor control switch to the "O.K. to Start" position will
disconnect the door opening circuit on a "power-off, fail-safe" criterion.
This electrical interlock will assure that the door is in a closed posi-
tion and the seal is satisfactory before the reactor can be started and
will assure that the door cannot be opened during operation.
5.4 Question 5(d)
"What size hole could exist in the containment shell without you
necessarily knowing about it within a short period of time_ and what
leakage rate would result?"
There appear to be three ways in which leaks might occur in the
containment tank during normal operation between regularly scheduled
leak tests:
i. Failure of seals at wire and cable penetrations, air locks, canal
opening, or truck door.
2. Unauthorized and unreported openings made in the tank wall by
workmen during maintenance, modifications, or installation of new
equipment.
5. Opening due to undetected failures in the tank structure (e.g.,
weld cracks).
The method of sealing and leak detection for the first type of
penetration has been described in Supplement IV. A further discussion
of these penetrations is given in sections 5(a) and 9 of this supplement.
It is felt that leakage during operation at any of these points is highly
improbable, but that if a significant leak should occur, it would be
detected almost in_nediately (see section 9).
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To minimize the possibility of leaks due to unauthorized and/or
unreported openings being made in the tank _alls, a rigid control will
be used for all structural modifications at the facility. The proposed
procedure is outlined in sections 7.3 and 7.4 of the Hazards Summary (ref.
2). Insofar as possible, all structural modifications involving the con-
tainment tank will be made just prior to a regularly scheduled leakage
test. The leakage test will be performed immediately after the modifica-
tions are completed, and before the reactor is restarted. Should modifi-
cations to the containment shell be required at times between the regular
leakage tests, a test will be made at the time the work is done. The
foregoing procedure will be rigidly followed to minimize the possibility
of unauthorized and/or unreported openings being made in the tank walls.
There is a small probability that leaks resulting from minor failures
in the tank structure (e.g., weld cracks) might exist. Inasmuch as leak
tests will be made with considerably higher overpressures in the shell
than will exist in normal operation, or even after the maximum credible
accident, it seems likely that such failures would develop during leak
testing rather than during normal operation between leak checks.
There is, at present, no way to estimat_ with any degree of accuracy
t_e size of opening which might occur (due t_ unauthorized penetrations
or to structural failures) and be undetected between leak tests. It
might be noted that this inability to detect, between leak tests, small
leaks due to unauthorized penetrations or structural failure is common
to most existing reactors with containment t_nks.
Further, it is recalled that during operation the pressure within the
containment tank will be at least one inch o_ water below atmospheric so
that any leakage under normal condition woull be into the tank. In the
event of a radioactive release, short of the maximum credible accident,
the tank ventilation system would be shut of_ and the tank pressure would
slowly rise to atmospheric pressure. At thi; time all leakage would be
due either to diffusion or changes in ambien_ pressure and would be
considerably less than the leakage rate for ).3 pounds per square inch
overpressure of the maximum credible accident.
5.5 Question 5(e)
"How often is the container to be tester[ for leak tightness?"
The containment tank will be given a co1_lete pressure check as
outlined in Supplement V for the accelerated overpressure test each
three months for the first year, and every s_x months thereafter. It
is felt that any defects in the containment vessel would show up in the
four overpressure tests of the first year.
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6. QUESTION6
"We would like someadditional information concerning the general
nature of the experimental program to be conducted in this facility, and
clarification of certain information which you have already provided."
o
D
!
6.1 Question 6(a)
"Whether you expect to conduct fuel bearing experiments (i) in the
core, (2) in loops outside of the core? What will be the maximum power
level of fuel bearing experiments which you are likely to want to perform?"
(i) No fuel bearing experiments will be run in the core. (2) These
experiments will be run in the through holes or beam holes outside the
core. (5) The NACA proposes to run fuel bearing experiments of maximum
power level of 1 megawatt.
6.2 Question 6(b)
"Could you be more explicit in your estimate of the possibility
and probability of failure of experiments which are likely to be conducted
in the facility? (Your attention is directed to statements made in the
Hazards Summary at pages i to 2 and pages 6 to 20.)"
The general types of experiments carried out in the NACA facility
will be similar to those carried out in the MTR or ORE. These types of
experiments will include pumped loop tests of fuel elements_ corrosion
tests (both capsule and pumped loop); irradiation of materials, testing
of small components (i.e., bearings, pumps, etc.) in a radiation field,
shielding studies 3 basic nuclear physics experiments, and so forth.
The possibility and probability of failure of these experiments might
be expected to be of the same order as the possibility or probability of
failure of similar experiments in the MTR or 0RR. (The accidents which
resulted in radioactive releases at the MTR in 1955 and 1956 are discussed
in the answer to 6(c) below.)
In reference to the statements made in the Hazards Summary at pages
i to 2 it is presumed that the statement referred to is, "Under these
conditions failures of experimental components can be expected on a routine
basis."
The failures we are referring to here are not failures of the experi-
mental loop_ but failures of the item being tested. These failures can be
divided into two categories: items whose failure under test involves no
appreciable radioactive release such as bearing tests in a radiation field,
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and items whose failure can involve appreciabl_ radioactive release such
as fuel element tests in pumpedloops. In both of these types of experi-
ments it is not expected that the experimental loop or structure will
normally fail andQthe possibility and probability of their failure might
be expected to be similar to MTRexperience as discussed above.
In reference to the statements madein the Hazards Summaryat pages
6 to 20 it is presumedthat the statements referred to are in section
6.2.S.I.
Section 6.2.5.1 attempts to estimate the type and extent of failures
which might occur in a fuel element test in a pumpedloop. As stated on
pages 6 to 20_ the probability of fission products leaking from the fuel
element into the experimental loop is large. The chance of leakage from
the experimental loop into the experiment container can is muchsmaller
and should parallel MTRexperience. The chance of leakage from the experi-
mental container can into the reactor containmeat tank is smaller still
as discussed in section 6.5 below.
Section 6.2.5.1 goes on to consider the type of failure which might
occur in the "maximumconceivable experiment accident". An accident of
this magnitude is unlikely to occur in the life of the reactor as evidenced
by the fact that, to the best of our knowledge, no accident of this magni-
tude has occurred to a fuel element pumped loop test in any reactor.
!
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6.Z Question 6(c)
"Could you be more explicit as to the resul.t of failure of experiments
in terms of possibility and probability of rele_se from the cans surround-
ing the experiment? What is your estimate of tl_e volume and nuclear
characteristics of radioactivity which could cr_,dibly be released from
experiments into the container ?"
As discussed above, the types of experiments which would be carried
out in the NACA reactor are very similar to the types of experiments
carried out in the MTRj and the possibility and probability of experiment
failure should be about the same. The most important difference is the
method in which these experiments would be carried out in the NACA reactor.
Every fuel bearing experiment in the NACA reactcr will be enclosed in an
experiment container can. This can would be maintained at low temperature
and its only function would be to contain radioactive releases from the
experiment.
It is felt that _the majority of the radioactive releases will be
confined to the experimental container can. A rough estimate is that at
least nine out of ten radioactive releases would be confined to the
experimental container cans.
_O
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As discussed in the answer to 6(b)_ it is expected that the number
of experiment failures will be about the same as the number of failures
at _SR. These experiment failures at MTR in 1955 and 1956 which resulted
in release of radioactivity are discussed in a letter to J. B. Philipson,
Director_ Division of Operations, Atomic Energy Commission_ Idaho Opera-
tions Office from J. P. Lyon, Assistant Manager_ Operations, Atomic Energy
Commission (Ly-179-57A). During this two year period 25 releases were of
sufficient importance to be noted individually. The releases range in
size from a few hundred microcuries to several thousand curies. In
addition_ 54 minor releases occurred in 1955 with the total activity re-
lease from all of these releases of about 2 millicuries. Assuming that
in the NACA reactor at least nine out of ten of these releases would be
restricted to the experimental container cans, it is expected that re-
leases to the containment tank would not exceed about i major release per
year with an activity release of the order of several hundred curies_ and
about 5 minor releases per year with an activity release of the order of
i00 microcuries or less.
A rough estimate of the maximum credible release of activity from the
experiment container can would be about i0 percent of the total activity
of a i megawatt experiment. The probability of a "maximum credible re-
lease" is small, and it is not expected to occur during the life of the
reactor.
6.4 Question 6(d)
"Will the reactivity effects of the experiments be determincd in a
critical assembly prior to insertion of the experiments in the reactor?"
All major fuel bearing experiments and any other experiments deemed
necessary will be tested in a critical assembly before being run in the
reactor.
7. QUESTION 7
"What would be the effect of credible releases (either from the maxi-
mum credible accident postulated or from lesser accidents) to employees
on-site ? What are the number of employees that may be affected by such
release ? What is your evaluation of your ability to move such employees
with sufficient rapidity to avoid dangerous exposure to radiation?"
The effect of releases of radioactivity expected in normal operation
will be negligible except to employees in the containment shell. For a
release of i00 millicuries of unknown airborne activity in the containment
shell and uniformly dispersed_ the weekly occupational dose of 300 mrem
would be exceeded in about one minute. A reasonable evacuation time for
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the i0 or fewer employees in the containment snell is 2 or S minutes_
therefore, no serious damagewould result. As a comparison, the maximum
amount of airborne activity released at any one time accidentally in the
reactor building of the Materials Testing Reactor during 1955 and 1956 was
estimated at 5 millicuries (ref. letter to J. B. Philipson, Director
Division of Operations, Atomic Energy Commission(Ly-179-57A). Most of
the releases at the MTRwere 2 millicuries or less. It is felt that a
i00 millieurie release is larger than that normally expected because of
the similarity with the MTRoperation.
It is pertinent to mention that 9 activitff releases at the MTRduring
1955 and 1956 required building evacuations. [f these sameincidents had
occurred in the NACAreactor, 8 of them would have required at most only a
containment shell evacuation. The one remaining release could have
occurred either inside or outside of the containment shell. Several of
the incidents confined to the containment shell also would probably have
been confined to experiment containers, and in this case, no evacuation
would have been necessary.
A considerably larger release would be reluired to affect employees
outside of the containment shell. Assumea large pumped-loop fuel bearing
experiment were to fail_ and in addition, a rupture of the experiment
container were to occur. Also, assumethat i percent of the fission pro-
ducts in the experiment were to be released to the quadrant pool water
and into the air of the containment shell. The estimated doses received
by the employees outside of the containment sh_ll is tabulated in the
following table.
Dose,
milliroentgens
0
4
i0
17
24
83
105
Number of peop_e affected
Day shift
7
7
76
6
50
S
14
N.ght shift
0
2
4
I
2
3
12
None of these doses are extreme in view o_' the very severe accident
assumed. These results were obtained assuming a full staff of about 167
employees. Reasonable evacuation times were a:_sumed based on experience
in civil defense drills at the Lewis laborator_ r. Consideration was taken
of the probable locations of personnel and shi,_Iding which would be avail-
able at their normal work locations and on the:.r evacuation routes. For
more severe accidents, these doses can be scal,_d up accordingly. For a
i0 percent fission product release from a I megawatt experiment, the maxi-
mum credible experiment release, the dose ratel; would be greater by a
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factor of i0. For the maximum credible accident to the reactor consisting
of i00 percent release of ths fission products in the reactor_ the scaling
factor would be 6000. Even for this extremely improbable situation; only
17 of the employees outside of the containment shell would receive 500
roentgens or more.
The number of employees present at any one time in the containment
vessel will be about ten. The number normally present will be considerably
less than this because most experiments will be operated remotely, and
there will be only occasional necessity for entering while the reactor is
operating. Shielding and beam hole experiments will require the most
attention, and these will also be remotely operated whenever practicable.
It is assumed that the principal hazard to employees in the contain-
ment shell is that of inhalation of radioactive gases or airborne partic-
ulate matter. Respiratory protection will be provided for each person in
the containment shell. This equipment will be used whenever monitor alarms
indicate an excessive airborne activity.
Public address equipment will sound evacuation alarms. Specific
instructions can be voiced simultaneously. Evacuation will be periodically
rehearsed.
8. QUESTION 8
"Is the containment vessel to be an ASME code vessel?"
The NACA containment tank meets the 1952 ASME Unfired Pressure Vessels
Code requirements for an internal pressure of 7.5 pounds per square inch.
This is 50 percent above the design pressure of S pounds per square inch,
and many times greater than the 0.3 pounds per square inch overpressure
which would result from the maximum credible accident (section 1.A,
Supplement V).
9. QUESTION 9
"How do you know that the vacuums in penetrations to which the vacuum
pump system is attached are being maintained? What size hole will cause
the reactor to be automatically shut down? What size hole in the pene-
tration is detectable by the measuring methods?"
Pressure switches in combination with a flow meter (s) will monitor
the vacuum in the penetrations. A flow equivalent to the maximum leakage
rate of the containment vessel will cause automatic shutdown of the reactor.
A hole one-sixteenth of an inch in diameter is detectable. (This corre-
sponds to approximately 1/3 of the allowable leakage rate.)
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i0. QUESTIONi0
"What is your evaluation of the feaslbi]ity of operation of your
proposed reactor at a site which would afford a higher degree of protection
to the health and safety of the public?"
During the period whenthe site for the NACAreactor was selected,
consideration was given to a more remote site such as the NRTSsite in
Idaho. The Plumbrook OrdnanceWorks offered a numberof advantages com-
pared to a site of this type:
i. Because of its proximity to the Lewis Laboratory of the NACA,the
reactor and its operating crew would have, near at hand, a large pool of
highly trained scientists and technicians who would be available to advise
and assist on all problems which might arise. In particular, since most
of the experiments will be conceived and constructed at the Lewis Labora-
toryj more of the people who designed and built the experiments could be
present at the various stages of the insertion and operation of the experi-
ment in the reactor with resulting improvemen_in efficiency and safety.
Therefore, the first advantage of the Plumbro.)k site is the availability,
near at handj of a large pool of highly trained scientists and technicians,
and in particular, of the people who designed and built the individual
experiments.
2. The second advantage of the Plumbrook site is in decreased opera-
ting costs. Becauseof its proximity to Lewi_ laboratory, a numberof
services which would otherwise be required at the reactor site maybe re-
duced or eliminated. For example, shop facilzties, stock rooms, computa-
tional facilities a_d manyadministrative and service functions such as
the payroll, time and leave, and purchase offices, can be reduced or
eliminated. Also, since most of the experimeiLts will be conceived and
built at the Lewis laboratory, the transportation cost of experiments to
and from the reactor will be considerably reduced.
S. The third advantage of the Plumbrook _ite is decreased initial
costs. The Plumbrook site is already developed. It has available on it
a copious water supply, more than ample electl icity, area drainage, roads,
and so forth. In addition, an unusedbuildin_ is available for use as
an Administration Building. The increased co_ts of developing somere-
mote site would have been substantial. To gi_ e someidea of the costs
of site development, the water intake system _rom Lake Erie to the Plum-
brook site, were it not available, would cost about four million dollars
to install.
4. Becausethe Plumbrook site is already developed and because of the
proximity to the Lewis laboratory, the reactol facility can be completed
more rapidly and would be available for reseazch considerably sooner than
if it were located at a more remote site.
I
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The chief disadvantage of the Plumbrook site compared to more remote
sites is its location near populated areas which would prohibit the carry-
ing out of the "most hazardous experiments." That is, there would be a
few experiments whose potential hazard to the local population would be
sufficiently great that they could not be carried out at the Plumbrook
site. To put this disadvantage in proper perspective, it is important
to note that the NACA reactor is not the only reactor of its type in the
country. The MTR and ETR# both located at NRTS in Idaho, are reactors
with similar facilities. Any experiment vital to the progress of scien-
tific knowledge or aircraft nuclear propulsion which is deemed too hazard-
ous for the Plumbrook site, could readily be carried out at MTR or ETR.
This fact minimizes this disadvantage of the Plumbrook site.
In summary, the Plumbrook site offers the advantages of improved
operation, lower operating costs, lower initial costs, and earlier avail-
ability for research as compared to a remote site. Its chief disadvantage,
the inability to carry out a few "most hazardous experiments," is reduced
to a minimum because of the availability of the MTR and ETR for these
types of experiments. In view of these considerations, it is felt that
the Plumbrook site is superior to a remote site.
ii. QUESTION ii
The Atomic Energy Commission has added the following questions to
those listed above.
"What system is proposed to measure leakage around the entrance of
doors at the reactor where personnel would be entering and exiting? How
will the leakage rate be maintained at the interlock doors when the pres-
sure difference is slight? What will be done when the pressure is up to
0.3 pounds per square inch, the maximum credible accident pressure rate
which has been postulated? How often and by what method will the gaskets
around the interlock doors be tested? (Will this be a recurring test?)"
There is no system proposed to measure leakage, as such, around the
personnel doors to the containment tank. Leakage tests, however, will
include the scheduled overpressure leak tests of the entire containment
vessel and either overpressure tests of the air-lock cavities individually
or helium leak detection tests of the door gaskets and structure with the
doors in a dogged down position.
Two air locks are proposed, each having a double set of mechanically
interlocked doors, which prevent either door from being opened unless the
other is closed and dogged tightly against its gaskets. A sufficient load
is supplied by the locking mechanism to assure that the gasket is tightly
sealed. A description of the proposed system is given in Supplement IV,
section 1.2.7, Air Locks and figures A and 5. There is also a pressure
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SEALANT RETAINING PLATES;
HOLES CUT TO APPROX.
SIZE OF; WIRE OR. CABLE
PRESSURE BELOW AT/V_OSPHERIC
I
I--I
O
L,q
TO VACUU/V_
SYSTEM
POTTING COMPOUND
PC 1102 C_ EQUAL
TANK BLDNG.
Figure i. - Typical wire or cable penetration and vacuum system.
NASA - Langley Field, Va. E-105
